d to be insolvent, de debt. Subser their respective btain a first judge the other action sion of Young v. fused an injuncation of the exe-

been granted proceeding to nith, with libthe hearing, rdingly made

red to Young

a motion to earing under the affidavits

g indebted to a as a means debt a note M. Smith, in orsed. Upon overing judgorser; under zed personal alleged. At ne defendant ebted to the

plaintiff on a note endorsed by defendant J. M. Smith, past due, for about \$800. The plaintiff shortly afterwards put this note in suit. R. C. Smith entered a defence to it, as he swears, to enable Hutty to get a first judgment in the suit on the note endorsed by him Smith, to which no defence was made. The defendant R. C. Smith, it is alleged, was at the time of the transfer to Hutty insolvent, and it does not appear that he had then, or has now, any means out of which the plaintiff can obtain payment.

The plaintiff files his bill, claiming that the transfer of this note to Hutty was under the circumstances fraudulent and void, and shall be so treated under section 17. chapter 26, Consolidated Statutes of Upper Canada, and that the judgment obtained under it should be vacated: or that any thing realised under it should be paid over to him the plaintiff; or in effect that Hutty should lose his priority as against the plaintiff, and that Smith's goods should be subjugated to his, the plaintiff's execution. There seems no doubt at present of the indebtedness of R.C. Smith to Hutty, to an amount of about £500. Whatever question may arise as to the right of Hutty to press his judgment against J. M. Smith, it seems to me there can be no pretence for setting aside his judgment against his principal debtor R. C. Smith. He might have taken R.C. Smith's note and recovered judgment against him on that, or on the account which Smith owed him. am asked to set aside this judgment against him, or to take such action in respect of it that another creditor may thus obtain priority. Why should that other creditor have priority? His debt does not appear to be entitled to any preference over Hutty's. He has a judgment against precisely the same parties, but later in point of time; and Young v. Christie very properly, I think, decides that one creditor facilitated, another delayed, by the recognized forms of lawin obtaining a judgment, affords no ground for interference. Why should I hand over the defendant's, the principal debtor's,