

of the Korean War. He criticizes Mr. Pearson's General Assembly speech of September 27, 1951, setting out objectives for the reunification of Korea as "ambitious, belligerent and self-contradictory". He also questions Mr. Pearson for voting for the Assembly resolution of October 7 on the reunification of Korea and shows how he

later backtracked. However, Mr. Pearson's skills as a diplomatist are amply demonstrated in the book as a whole.

For those interested in seeing the patterns being set in Canada's policies in the UN seeking solutions to international security problems, Stair's book can serve as a useful textbook.

United Nations Journal: A Delegate's Odyssey by William F. Buckley, Jr., New York, G. P. Putnam's, 1974.

The Diplomacy of Constraint by Denis Stairs, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1974.

Letter to the editor

INDIA'S OPTION . . .

Sir,

The headline to the Morrison/Page article analyzing India's recent nuclear behaviour (*Perspectives*, July/August 1974) projects an image of India which is not only exaggerated but also untrue. To talk of India as a "world power" is plain nonsense. This theme was outlined by Indians in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but it is not seriously discussed in policy circles in the 1970s. Perhaps Professors Morrison and Page should offer some evidence of "India's ambition to be a world power". India is not a world power, just as China is not, and I wonder if nuclear weapons are really sources of influence in regional conflicts. True, there is international prestige to be gained from the visibility of a nuclear explosion but at the same time "prestige" is a tenuous basis for assessing success in managing foreign policy interests.

Secondly, I am perplexed by the second part of the first paragraph of the article. Two flaws should be noted. (1) If India entertained seriously the idea of becoming a great power — and Nehru's speeches do not express such a conviction clearly (Nehru referred to India's cultural heritage and *potential* importance but also noted Indian weaknesses) — the 1962 crisis changed that focus. (2) In conceptualizing Indian strategies the paragraph reflects a tendency to oversimplify. A non-aligned approach and a nuclear power approach are not mutually exclusive in Indian foreign relations. The only real difference between the 1950s and the 1970s is that now Indians talk and act, whereas in the 1950s they just talked and talked.

Thirdly, I am somewhat confused as to what is meant by the following statement: "but through all this Canada failed to comprehend India's motives and policies" (p. 23). Between 1954 and 1958, certain decisions in principle were made at the ministerial level about external affairs and atomic energy. True, the decision to develop a North American/South Asian focus was based on sentiments shared by Nehru and St. Laurent, including an emphasis on the Commonwealth and an effort to depolarize the Cold War. True, as the authors note on page 25, Canada wanted to advertise its atomic technology program by investing in India. Canadians did not simply stumble into a nuclear relationship with India. Rather, political and commercial considerations were at work. These may have changed today, but that does not mean they did not exist in the 1950s.

The suggestion that Canada failed to comprehend India's motives should thus be carefully assessed. True, Bhabha had considerable foresight and he negotiated agreements which gave India a free hand. But when we talk about "Indian" motives we should be very clear whether we mean the motives of Nehru or those of Bhabha. There is some evidence — albeit not public — which indicates that Bhabha sought nuclear weapons and a deterrence strategy for India, but Nehru was firm against nuclear weapons while sanctioning nuclear projects which could be converted into weapons programs. There is a duality in India's nuclear policy which should be assessed in detail, to note the potential links and discontinuities. One should be careful not to read India's behaviour according to Western cultural and policy experiences. Just because the first nuclear test was the first step in a weapons program for the five nuclear powers does not necessarily mean that it is also the same for India. It may be, but then it may not. There is a real need in the Indo-Canadian dialogue for Canadians — media and university types, officials and ministers — to assess India's behaviour in terms of Indian values so that the psychology of Indian nuclear decision-making can be identified. It seems likely that Indians and Canadians refer to different values and different "decisions" in the past, even though both sides may use a common phrase — for example, "peaceful uses".