

been made clear to Tokyo that the practice of appeasement is no longer the policy of the Government of the United States. Having thus failed in both major objectives—being unable or unwilling to make the sacrifices of position and prestige which friendship with America and Britain would now require, being under tremendous pressure from Berlin to take an active part in the execution of Axis policies, and being urged by the activist elements in their own country to break the gradually tightening bonds of economic restraint being wound about Japan by the democratic powers—in this impasse where a false move might well result in personal tragedy as well as national disaster, the Konoye administration found resignation to be the simplest if not the only solution for its individual and collective responsibilities.

3. General Tojo, who now takes up the seals of office relinquished by his politically hypochondriacal predecessor, is a man of very different mood and temper. Himself the son of a famous General, he has lived all his life in the military atmosphere and has devoted his unquestioned talents to the study of service problems. He has twice been stationed in Germany and is one of the senior officers who has been chiefly responsible for the close modelling of Japanese military tactics on those of Prussia. He has held some of the "toughest" assignments in the Japanese Army and is a man of positive manners and action. It may be that General Tojo's recent experiences on the political front (he was Vice-Minister of War from 1938 to 1941 and Minister during the last three months) may have modified his inherited and acquired characteristics, but it is probably safer to assume that he is still a man of action with the traditional military scorn for political compromises and diplomatic concessions.

4. The change of Government does not, of course, reduce the proportions of the dilemma in which Japan is enmeshed. The external dangers of any action are enormous, but they are probably equalled if not surpassed by the internal difficulties of inaction. The conflict is still unsolved and perhaps the only safe prediction is that General Tojo is much more likely than was Prince Konoye to seek a solution by positive action. That this may mean involvement in war against Britain and America is not likely to be so great a deterrent to the tough and essentially uneducated General as it was to the more supple and more politically experienced Prince who has now resigned.

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*Le chargé d'affaires au Japon au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in Japan to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 196

Tokyo, October 18, 1941

Although the Cabinet change at this time appears to be ominous, new Cabinet does not necessarily signify immediate military action. General Tojo, who is concurrently Prime Minister, Home Minister and Minister for War,