

observation. This distinction, important as it is, and, one would think, sufficiently obvious, is like the distinction overlooked by Hume, persistently disregarded by the opponents of Christianity, and is eloquently overlooked or kept out of sight by the author of "Supernatural Religion." Nor, again, can it be difficult to show to an ordinary understanding, that the universally current assumption of the more modern infidelity, that any reported fact of a miraculous nature, such as the resurrection of Christ, is to be at once discredited and set aside, without any consideration either of the proof by which it may be sustained, or of the possible end it may have been designed to subserve, involves nothing less than the assumption of man's competency and capacity to sit in judgment upon God, and to determine the procedure proper for Him in all possible circumstances; whereas, repudiating an assumption so monstrous, the Christian apologist's assumption is simply that of our competency to judge of our own human nature, by the knowledge we have of it from actual experience and observation,—a knowledge which, including as it does a knowledge of the laws that regulate human action, fully warrants the affirmation that the falsehood of certain kinds of testimony, or of testimony in certain circumstances, is immeasurably more incredible than the event, in whose favour it is given, is extraordinary and improbable. Nor, once more, can it be difficult to make it plain that it is unreasonable to expect, as the current infidelity insists, that God's revelations of Himself should be accompanied by such an amount of evidence as would carry conviction to the minds of all men indiscriminately, however they may be affected towards God; inasmuch as such an expectation can have no ground except the unwarrantable assumption that the attainment of full satisfaction of mind in relation to divinely revealed truth cannot, in any way or in any degree, depend on men's moral condition; whereas on the contrary, the most important moral purposes may be designed, as we can clearly see they are actually subserved, by God's giving just so much light as He does give and no more.

2. Our notice of the assumption last referred to, naturally leads to a suggestion respecting the mode of dealing with objections in connection with religious instruction. The objection to the divinity of Christian teaching involved in that assumption is often expressed with such confidence, and is so much a commonplace or first principle of unbelief, that its unreasonableness should be not unfrequently insisted on. It is said by one, for example, "There ought not to be the least shadow of a doubt whether a given book is from God or not." And again, "If the handwriting of Jehovah in the Scriptures be doubtful, it cannot be divine." The objection is not simply that the evidence of the