

North-South Relations

international co-operation which were built in the seventies to help deal with the uncertainties of the eighties to which the Prime Minister referred. Canada cannot—nor can other responsible states—turn inward when faced with the difficulties of the eighties. The seventies would have been far more difficult internationally without the safety net of institutions and procedures which have been built up with such difficulty and in which we have invested so much. We cannot now turn away from these institutions and frameworks. We need them to a greater extent than ever before.

I should like to look ahead at the eighties through the prism of the six principal Canadian values to which I have already referred. The eighties will require more emphasis on some of these themes than on others in order to deal with new realities. All these values are important. Any one from time to time can require the highest priority from the government.

The goal of Canadian foreign policy is to create a just and peaceful world in which all nations can achieve greater well-being and prosperity. In order to attain this goal, particular priority has to be given at the present time to promoting social justice and fostering economic growth.

There are two themes—working for peace and security and safeguarding sovereignty and independence—which are fundamental to everything else. There can be little hope for economic growth or social justice if one's security or sovereignty is threatened. Themes interlink.

Canada defends its sovereignty and independence through a variety of means—through boundary and territorial negotiations, for example—but working for peace and security represents the most important way for Canada to defend its sovereignty.

Canadian security policy in the past 30 years has been based on three foundations of peace: first, deterrence of war through collective defence represented by participation in NATO and NORAD; second, verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements; and third, mechanisms and arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

When it was clear that the collective arrangements for peace provided for under the United Nations charter were not going to be allowed to work, it became imperative to make other security arrangements. Canada joined with others in creating the North Atlantic Alliance in 1949 and has since contributed to the collective deterrence and defence capacity of NATO.

I remarked a few moments ago that the hon. member for New Westminster-Coquitlam (Miss Jewett) commented extensively on our participation in the nuclear strategies of our alliance. I know hon. members in the House generally will realize that this has to be set against the background of rejection in her party—again, I understand, being reiterated, to the great embarrassment of its leader—of the NATO alliance. I hope the hon. member is prepared to make the same points she has made here to the New Democratic Premier of Saskatchewan, Premier Blakeney, and I hope others here from that province will carry the message to her, since she has left the House.

Miss Jewett: I am right here.

Mr. MacGuigan: She is just now returning. I hope the hon. member will carry the same kind of message to Premier Blakeney of Saskatchewan, that good New Democrat who is sending Saskatchewan uranium all over the world for the purposes which she says she so frankly detests.

Miss Jewett: Are you still reading, Mark?

Mr. MacGuigan: For the Canadian government, along with defence capacity, security also requires the search for arms control. If the armaments spiral is ever to be broken, verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements must be concluded. Arms control and disarmament is the pursuit of undiminished security at lower levels of armaments and expenditure. The step by step approach takes time, beginning with the mutual perception of security which can lead to agreements to limit arms and to control their development and deployment. Once arms competition is contained, efforts can be focused on reductions, which would continue to reflect that same approximate security balance.

The prospects for concluding arms control and disarmament agreements continue to be limited. The postponement of consideration of ratification of SALT II by the U.S. Senate followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979. The review of arms control and disarmament policies by the new U.S. administration should result in a new start in the SALT process. At the last NATO foreign minister's meeting in Rome, which I attended, the United States reaffirmed the intention of the previous administration to go forward with discussions on the limitation of theatre nuclear forces. Negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty and on a ban on chemical weapons have continued to be protracted.

It is, indeed, in the process of peacemaking that real disarmament progress is likely to be registered. Many of the crisis spots in the world are not cast in ideological and imperial terms as is the current case between the East and the West. The vast majority of disputes, particularly in the Third World, are regional in scope and often reflect deep-seated and historical quarrels in relation to local and ill-defined issues. Canada has been active in seeking solutions to international conflicts.

A major focus of Canada's recent arms control activities was the Prime Minister's proposal at the first United Nations special session devoted to disarmament in 1978 in the context of restraining the technological momentum behind the strategic nuclear arms race. The elements of the "strategy of suffocation"—a comprehensive test ban treaty, a ban on the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles, a ban on production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes and an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on a new strategic nuclear weapons systems—were not new to the arms control discussions. What was new was the concept of their interaction in combination to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons among heretofore non-nuclear weapon states or the nuclear weapons states themselves.