

welcomed the recent assurances by the Co-chairmen, in response to points raised by some delegations, that they consider Articles I and II to contain no loopholes to proliferation of practical significance.

Turning to Article III, while Canada would have preferred an equitable safeguards article, which would apply safeguards to the peaceful nuclear activities of all parties to the Treaty, we consider the formulation of Article III, submitted on January 18 by the United States and the Soviet Union, to be an acceptable compromise arising out of lengthy and difficult negotiations. As a non-nuclear-weapon state, Canada has been greatly assisted in coming to a decision to support this formulation by the public undertakings of the United States and the United Kingdom last December to accept safeguards on their own non-military nuclear activities. We earnestly appeal to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to give a similar undertaking.

We would urge other members of this Committee also to support the latest formulation of Article III. This article is, in our view, essential to the credibility and working of the Treaty, because it would provide effective means of ensuring that the terms of the Treaty were being respected by the parties. As we have often stated in this Committee, Canada considers provision for effective verification to be fundamental to realistic and durable measures of arms control, not least to invest them with the vital element of international credibility. Article III would, we are sure, accord the Treaty the necessary credibility and instil in parties the confidence necessary to ensure that the Treaty would be effective in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and enhancing the security of the community of nations.

We would remind members of the Committee that the intent of the article is to apply safeguards in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system. This safeguards system has been sanctioned by the General Conference of the Agency, which claims the membership of every country represented in this Committee. It has, moreover, attracted wide international support and has stood the test of time and experience. Article III envisages not the imposition of a new untried concept and set of procedures, not a departure from established norms and practices, but rather the logical, and, we trust, progressive, extension of an effective, unobtrusive and generally acceptable set of controls against the diversion of nuclear energy to weapon purposes.

What is required at this juncture is merely some general indication of support for the principles and intent of the article, particularly from those members of the Committee with active peaceful nuclear programmes. No member can be expected to make a final judgment on or commitment to the article until the Treaty is in final form. All members will have opportunity to review and assess the viability of all provisions of the Treaty before they sign and ratify it. Even as parties, they will have the opportunity to review the actual functioning of the treaty and the extent to which all parties are living up to its terms and spirit....