examine the ability of staging a trial overflight. After consultations it was decided that a Canadian military aircraft would overfly Hungary in early January.

While every effort was made to ensure that this overflight mirrored the procedures that might be agreed to in an "Open Skies" Treaty, it was recognized that the greatest lessons would be derived from the flight if extra time were taken at each stage of the process to evaluate each activity immediately. Thus, the periods devoted to notification, flight planning time or the total time elapsed between initial notification and the actual overflight were slightly longer than the corresponding periods that might be agreed to in the eventual Treaty.

Perhaps the most important difference between this trial overflight and an actual "Open Skies" overflight was the fact that the Canadian aircraft carried no on-board sensors. The aircraft was therefore incapable of accumulating any data on Hungarian activities.

On January 4, 1990 a Canadian Forces C-130 Hercules aircraft left Canadian Forces Base Lahr in the Federal Republic of Germany. Bound for Budapest airport, the aircraft made its transit flight over Czechoslovakia with the full cooperation of the Czech authorities. Upon landing at Budapest the aircraft was inspected by Hungarian authorities who were allowed full access to the aircraft in order to assure themselves that it was unarmed. Since the aircraft was not carrying sensors, there was no check to ensure that the sensors conformed to whatever specifications may be agreed to in negotiation. The right of the host to conduct both of these inspections is expected to be a standard feature of an "Open Skies" Treaty.

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