

by national surveillance stations, with third parties manning tactical early warning watch stations and performing additional verification activities such as aerial surveillance. The enlarged demilitarized buffer zone would be monitored by an expanded United Nations Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) with a more authoritative and durable mandate.<sup>42</sup> Given recent advances in sensor technology, the new observer force could make extensive use of upgraded day and night observation devices as well as networks of unattended ground sensors.

Should a new interim agreement be reached, Syria might find a modified observer force patterned on UNDOF to be politically acceptable insofar as it would require only an incremental change in the present security system. For Israel, acceptance of any new arrangement on the Golan would likely be conditional upon US agreement to maintain a physical presence on the Golan either by manning early warning stations directly or by adopting a more elaborate system whereby observers/inspectors verified the demilitarized and limited forces zones. Israel would, no doubt, insist that US aerial monitoring, which now reinforces the UNDOF, be upgraded and deployed more frequently. Whether Syria would accept a US presence on the Golan, however, remains unclear.<sup>43</sup>



△ This observation post of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) on the Golan Heights between Syria and Israel is staffed by observers from several nations, including Canada. From similar posts in the Sinai, personnel were able to observe and report happenings which might have violated the Sinai Disengagement Agreements and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. In the Gidi and Mitla passes the Sinai Field Mission, composed of US civilian contract personnel, established sophisticated sensing devices to assist in monitoring vehicular and other movements in these areas during the Sinai II Disengagement Agreement. Ground-based observation posts and sensor fields constituted one of several components of the verification system for these agreements. (Canadian Forces Photo).

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>43</sup> In contrast to the Sinai experience where Egypt's President Sadat was eager to have a US presence in the Sinai as part of a broader foreign policy strategy of seeking closer ties with Washington, President Assad had no such desires and remained very much tied to his Soviet patron. Within these constraints (including unremitting hostility toward Israel and the US), Syria may only consider a third-party presence that does not include the US. Israel, of course, would then be forced to consider whether other third-party candidates are suitable.

