AMA

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In the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons and stop the arms race, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968. Under this treaty, states with nuclear weapons agreed not to transfer the technology necessary to make these weapons. In return, states without nuclear weapons agreed not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire them. Nuclear weapons nations also agreed to work towards reducing the size of their nuclear arsenals. Through its inspection system, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for verification of this treaty. Though it has several functions apart from monitoring the NPT, the IAEA is the primary agency responsible for ensuring that non-nuclear weapon states which have signed the NPT do not attempt to divert nuclear material from peaceful purposes to weapons production. The IAEA has developed several techniques for this purpose, and relies upon its ability to account for fuel and to inspect nuclear facilities to ensure that the amount of spent fuel which comes out of a nuclear reactor is consistent with the amount which went in.

The IAEA and its methods are all examples of what is known as a treaty specific verification regime. A treaty specific verification regime is one in which the authority to inspect a given site devolves from the principles and practices outlined in a specific treaty. Furthermore, the inspecting agency has the authority to look for potential violations of the treaty and no more. It is not empowered to go on general fishing expeditions designed to ferret out information on a wide variety of subjects. Thus far, only treaty specific verification organizations have been established. At present, there is no plan to establish any verification organization which would not be tied to a specific treaty, though this idea has been discussed.

Outer space is another highly sensitive issue. At present, the most important treaty dealing with this area is the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. It forbids the stationing of any nuclear weapon or any other weapon of mass destruction in space or on the moon. The Treaty itself is silent on how the ban on nuclear weapons in orbit will be verified. Current technologies to identify satellites and their purposes include ground-based telescopes

and electronic listening devices. In the future, space-based sensors may also become more frequently used.

Verification has been recognized as the most significant factor in international disarmament and arms control negotiations in the last decade. Over the years, Canada's External Affairs ministers have pledged Canadian expertise to the development of verification procedures. For example, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, has said "in large measure, our survival may depend on the confidence we have in arms control agreements. This confidence must be built on reasonable assurance that the terms of the agreement are being fulfilled. We are committed to providing an intelligent opinion in arms control and disarmament negotiations. Verification is an integral part of those talks. Without it, no meaningful treaties can be negotiated." It comes back to the example of the bank. If we're sure our bank isn't mismanaging our money, we will feel safer leaving it there. We may be giving up a little control over what it's used for when we don't need it, but we know that it's safe. When we all play by the rules, we all can win the game.

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CONTRIBUTIONS

1.	Canadian Federation of University of Women — essay contest	\$500.00
2.		\$1,900.00
3.		\$6,050.00
4.		\$4,000.00
5.	The state of the s	\$19,760.00
6.	Science for Peace - Toronto Chapter — University College Lectures in Peace Studies	\$3,000.00
7.		
	security	\$7,000.00
8.	Dellate data base 0	\$2,500.00
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TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS

\$44,710.00

GRANTS

1.	Dr. Michael Mepham — Langage et Ideologie	\$7,000.00
	Canadian Student Pugwash — annual conference	\$9,488.00
	William Epstein — participation at Pugwash Symposium, Dublin, Ireland, May 5-7, 1989	\$320.00
	Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies — publication of May 89 Seminar proceedings	\$7,500.00

TOTAL OF GRANTS
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND GRANTS

\$24,308.00 \$69,018.00