

During the ensuing few weeks the Western side sought to learn the real meaning of the new Soviet plan and to develop a Western response to it which would evidence the Western desire to reach an accommodation of views. Canada in particular stressed the desirability of negotiating by means of balanced concessions designed to take advantage of areas of mutual agreement and to draw on the suggestions advanced by the two sides.

However, despite their knowledge that the Western side was about to table a new proposal embodying concessions, the Soviet side abruptly withdrew from the Ten-Nation Committee on June 27. The latest Western proposals were subsequently circulated in the General Assembly by the United States.

Consistent with its firm conviction that progress towards disarmament can come only from patient and painstaking negotiations, Canada immediately sought ways of ensuring that the talks would be resumed with the least possible delay. To this end the Canadian Delegation took a leading part in having the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations convened in August. In that body, the membership of which is the same as that of the General Assembly itself, Canadian efforts resulted in the inclusion in the resolution unanimously adopted of a recommendation that "in view of the urgency of the problem, continued efforts be made for the earliest possible continuation of international negotiations."

Negotiations had, in fact, not been resumed by the time the fifteenth session of the General Assembly convened in September. Moreover, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had been so strained after the U-2 and RB-47 incidents that the two countries showed little disposition to consult together. Accordingly, while the lengthy debates in plenary and in the First Committee were characterized by many expressions of concern about the deadlock on disarmament, the propagandist content of a number of the interventions boded ill for the prospect of early agreement on how to proceed.

Thirteen draft resolutions in all were eventually tabled before the First Committee. Two of these recorded the respective positions of the Eastern and Western sides on the important question of the principles which should guide any resumed negotiations. A third text represented the efforts of a group of delegations, led by that of India, to develop a compromise formula for drawing the two sides together in regard to these principles. Soviet approval of the suggested compromise was made conditional on a number of tendentious interpretations which did much to destroy the value of the Indian initiative. In any case the compromise was not acceptable to the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the general debate Mr. Khrushchov had, in addition to announcing new modifications in the Soviet plan, called for the addition of neutral members to the negotiating forum. He had also threatened that failure to support the Soviet Union's principles would result in its refusal to continue to dis-