

tenet of the new robust and virile philosophy, which regards "purposeful action" as the source and explanation of truth and reality. For Thought itself is but a "mode of conduct," and knowledge derivative from it.\* Prof. James put forward the "will to believe" as "an intellectual right (in certain cases) to decide between alternative views. . . by other than purely intellectual considerations, viz., their emotional interest and practical value." This doctrine has been decried as "rank irrationalism." Now, if we had to choose between Irrationalism and Intellectualism, the former ought to be preferred. But Prof. James' doctrine is by no means irrational; it is a vindication of the actual reason by showing that it is permeated through and through by acts of faith. Mr. Schiller, however, claims that Prof. James has not been radical enough; he ought to have denied altogether "the traditional notion of beliefs determined by pure reason alone."† Reason is really, an instrument for enabling us to adapt ourselves to the environment. It has no other use than to subserve the fundamental needs of our life. Even the so-called theoretical principles by which we seek to harmonize our experience are all at bottom devices for enabling us the better to realize ourselves.

This may be shown by asking what is meant by Truth. Now, it has been generally recognized since Kant that no satisfactory answer to the question, *What is Reality?* can be given until we have decided another question: *What can I know as real?* What has not been generally recognized is that Knowledge is not the mechanical

operation of a passionless, "pure" intellect, which

Grinds out Good and grinds out Ill,  
And has no purpose, heart or will;  
on the contrary, Knowledge is essentially that way of conceiving Reality which subserves our needs and our ends. The idea that Knowledge reveals but does not affect the nature of Reality—that Knowledge is simply a "copy" of what already exists independently of it—is "one of those sheer assumptions which are incapable, not only of proof, but even of rational defence. We come into contact with reality only in the act of 'knowing' or experiencing it. Hence we have no right to assume that 'what the Real *is* in the act of knowing, it is also outside that relation. One might as well argue that because an orator is eloquent in the presence of an audience, he is no less voluble in addressing himself."‡ It is therefore meaningless to ask what the real is in itself. Nor can we say that reality has a rigid nature which is unaffected by our treatment of it, any more than that it is absolutely plastic to our every demand. The actual fact is that the process of knowledge is a case of intervention between subject and object. "When the mind 'knows' reality both are affected, just as when a stone falls to the ground both it and the earth are attracted. We must therefore discard the notion that in the constitution of the world we count for nothing, that it matters not what we do, because Reality is what it is, whatever we may do. It is true, on the contrary, that our action is essential and indispensable, that to some extent the world (our world) is of our making, and that without us no-

\*Schiller's Humanism, page 4. †Ibid, page 7. ‡Ibid, page 11.