

during the continuance of his service, or at any time thereafter, serve or solicit, or in any way interfere with, any of the customers who should at any time be served by, or be then longing to, the plaintiffs in their business. After leaving the plaintiffs' employ the defendant started business as a milkman and served with milk and solicited customers of the plaintiffs. The defendant contended that the agreement was invalid, on the ground that it was unreasonable and too wide, both as regards space and time,—also because it purported to prevent the defendant from soliciting plaintiffs' customers, who became such after defendant's employment ceased. The Divisional Court (Williams and Wright, JJ.), on appeal from the County Court, limited the injunction to persons who were customers of the plaintiffs at any time while the defendant was in the plaintiffs' employment, and the Divisional Court (Lord Esher, M.R., and Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ.), held that this judgment could not properly be interfered with, that the agreement must be taken to refer to the particular business carried on by the plaintiffs at the time it was made, and was therefore not open to the objection of being too wide as regards space, and that it was severable as regarded the customers to whom it was intended to apply, and that though it was too wide as to customers becoming such after the defendant quitted the plaintiffs' employment, yet it was good as to those who had been customers at any time during his employment. According to Rigby, L.J., judicial opinion on the subject of restraint of trade is undergoing, or rather has undergone, a considerable change since the earlier cases were decided, and the only test of the validity of such agreements is now considered to be, is whether or not it is reasonably necessary for the protection of the person in whose favor it is made.

CRIMINAL LAW—EXTRADITION—FALSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS—EXTRADITION ACT, 1870 (33 & 34 VICT., C. 52)—(R.S.C., C. 143).

*In re Arton*, (1896) 1 Q.B. 509, the rule nisi, granted for a habeas corpus, as noted ante p. 187, was argued. The ground upon which the rule was obtained was that the crime for which the applicant had been committed for extradition was