

affirm that, had the war of independence never taken place, the vast colony forming now the United States, with over fifty million inhabitants, could hold the position to England that Canada does without voice in the chief matters of legislation? The bare statement shows the impossibility of the colonial position as a permanency. Long ere the present size of the United States had been attained, the necessity for representation or separation must have arisen. And so it must be with Canada; the day will come when the national necessities will require either representation or separation. Not that this separation will be *a priori* caused by want of loyalty to England; the sentiment of love to England is strong in this country; but when the material interests of the country necessitate that she should have a voice in the chief legislation, then, if that sentiment cannot receive its highest gratification by federal union with England, that sentiment must be sacrificed to the material interests. There can be no logical escape from this conclusion. The necessity may not arise this year, nor next, nor even ten years hence, but *ultimately* it must arise.

Before leaving this part of the subject, I would wish to point out a collateral advantage that would accrue to England from the adoption of the federal system.

We are all of us pretty familiar with the Irish question. Though we may not sympathise with Mr. Parnell in the course he is taking in preaching but slightly-modified communism; yet there are substantial Irish grievances which justify discontent. Important among these is the want of power to legislate upon their own local affairs, and a very slight acquaintance with the heterogeneous mass of legislation undertaken by Parliament at Westminster will convince any one that it is impossible for that body properly to deal with, or even to understand, all the local

matters brought before it. The cry for Home Rule is the outcome of a popular necessity. But Home Rule, under the present political system, is an impossibility. If granted, it would mean the dismemberment of the United Kingdom; for it would be impossible to grant a Parliament for Ireland, and yet retain Irish members at Westminster, so long as the English Parliament continued to legislate upon English and Scotch local affairs. But Home Rule under a federation of the Empire would follow as naturally as that we here have Home Rule in each of our various Provinces. While in the Imperial House every part of the Empire would be represented, and thus a proper hold and control secured over each part of the Empire, yet each part would have its local Parliament for the management and control of local affairs. Would not this be an immense boon, not only to Ireland, but also to England?

Though the benefit resulting to England and her colonies from a Federal Union are immense, and scarcely to be overestimated; yet we cannot be blind to the fact that there would be great difficulties in the way of securing this. Not the least among these would be the stubborn resistance of the English people to change, in the political system, simply because it was change. Though a federation of the Empire is now favourably viewed by many of the leading men in England in various classes in life; though it could be shown to be most productive of beneficial results to both England and her colonies under various aspects; yet it must be a considerable time before the arguments in its favour have sufficiently permeated society to become a moving force in any political action. In the present state of public opinion, no political leader could adopt 'Federation of the Empire' as the watch-word of his party. Perhaps, too, before this proper understanding had been reached, the forces at work in Canada would have advised separa-