

It is plain, we again assert, from these remarks that Armstrong could not have been aware of Proctor's real situation, and we shall proceed to urge in detail our objections to his conclusions. First as to the prompt retreat to General Vincent, unencumbered with baggage. We have no defence to make of Proctor on this count, too many of our contemporaries have expressed themselves strongly, in reprobation of the ill-judged manner in which the retreat was conducted, to permit us to urge aught in vindication. One fact, however, is remarkable, Veritas the earliest writer on the subject, one by no means sparing in condemnation, and who might have been supposed to be thoroughly acquainted with the pros and cons of the affair, is silent on the point, confining his remarks to a stricture on the severity of Sir George Prevost's general order. This is significant and leads us to pause ere we adopt too readily all that has been said in condemnation of Proctor.

Secondly,—As to the vigorous defence of the post committed to his custody. We have already shown the difficulties by which Proctor was surrounded, and that it was impossible for him to find provisions for his troops as well as for the Indians and their families. Gen. Armstrong lost sight, too, of the fact that "the post" had been to a great degree dismantled of its guns, which had been required to arm Barclay's fleet, and had accordingly been appropriated for that purpose, and captured with that fleet.

Proctor was, we think, to blame for the deposition of his forces at the Moravian town, but even this is, as we have shown, a mere matter of opinion, as the observations, quoted in our last chapter, show. We must not allow one passage in Armstrong to pass unnoticed—it is when he speaks of the formation which enabled *four hundred mounted infantry armed with rifles, hatchets, and butcher knives*, to win the battle in a single minute.

Had we not already shown the overwhelming numbers of Harrison's army, the reader would be led to suppose that a corps of four hundred men, armed hastily with any weapons and horses they could collect, had routed in one minute seven hundred British veterans. We need scarcely go into this subject, as we have both shown the constitution and habits

of the body of mounted riflemen (not infantry) and the whole number of Harrison's army, we therefore only direct the reader's attention to the passage as another proof how prone Americans are to misrepresent.

It is not often that we have occasion to commend an American commander for modesty; we must not omit, therefore, on the present occasion to point out an instance of it as occurring in Harrison's despatch. He admits that "the number of our troops was certainly greater than that of the enemy." This is something even for an American General, but the pains he takes to do away with the impression, that numbers had aught to do with the fate of the day, is also noteworthy. Accordingly, he adds, in the next paragraph, "but when it is recollected that they had chosen a position, that effectually secured their flank, which it was impossible for us to turn and that we could not present to them a line more extended than their own, *it will not be* considered arrogant for me to claim for my troops the palm of superior bravery." Can anything be more absurd than this last paragraph? Here were over three thousand Americans opposed to something like four hundred and seventy British, and yet the American General, instead of honestly confessing that by dint of superior numbers he overcame his opponents, descends to the meanness of twaddling about the superior position chosen by Proctor, and claims on that account superior bravery for his men. We should scarcely have noticed this passage in Harrison's despatch had we not found that he thereby gained his object, to throw dust in the eyes of his compatriots. That this was effected is to be discovered in the fact that every town throughout the Union was illuminated, and every church rung out a merry peal on the occasion. All this to be sure might have been a political measure, or, as General Wilkinson calls it, "a military deception," but still it is difficult to imagine that any sober-minded American, in possession of the truth, could or would have seen reason to exult in the circumstance of three thousand five hundred of his countrymen overcoming some four hundred and seventy British and some Indians.

Harrison's end was nevertheless gained, and one of the members for South Carolina, a Mr.