like the proverbial squirrel, have to run harder simply to stay in place. In the final analysis, the first option is not really an option of strategy at all. Directed as it is toward preserving the present balance in the Canada-U.S. relationship in an external setting of predictable change, it would inevitably involve a substantially reactive posture on Canada's part.

Costs involved

WO

ınd

it

of

the

on-

nks

op-

lan

nal-

ing

.da-

less

lian

tue

the

t is

the

able

tity

ibu-

s is,

ages

na-

eco-

per-

that

is a

mul-

rde-

from

ex-

the-

rela-

i wo

more

be-

the

as to

or, of

s the

nited

) the

ence,

stinct

they

they

r im-

way.

d life

per-

f the

ion –

sition

, not

rance.

l pull

may,

The second option-closer integration with the United States - would involve costs in terms of the Canadian identity. Even if limited to a free-trade area, it would probably be unrealistic to assume that the momentum generated by this option could be confined to the economic and industrial sphere. The many common denominators, based on contiguity and affinity, that link Canada and the United States, would receive a strong impetus. To resist them would require more deliberate effort and appear to make less sense because the second option implies a judgment that the effort to resist the continental pull is likely to be unavailing. To the extent that a real risk to Canada's distinctness as a political and cultural community was apprehended, recourse to the second option could involve a serious strain on the domestic consensus in Canada.

The third option - a comprehensive strategy to strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of our national life - assumes that the continental tide can be stemmed to some extent and contained within bounds that approximate more closely the wider, global thrust of interdependence. It sees, as did the recent foreign policy review, "the judicious use of Canadian sovereignty" as "the key to Canada's continuing freedom to develop according to its own perceptions". More specifically, it looks to the mutually-reinforcing use of various policy instruments as the proper strategy to achieve greater Canadian distinctness. It inevitably takes account of its own limitations. It does not seek to distort the realities of the Canada-United States relationship or the fundamental community of interest that lies at the root of it.

Distinctness is not the only criterion by which the options available to Canada in its conduct of the U.S. relationship should be judged. Independence is another. Distinctness and independence are clearly related, but they are not the same thing. In the broadest sense independence is related ultimately to the capacity of governments to formulate and conduct policy

on the basis of national perceptions for the achievement of national objectives in the domestic and international environments. Distinctness, on the other hand, is an attribute that applies to a national society in all its various manifestations.

In trying to judge the constraints on Canadian independence arising out of the U.S. relationship, it is necessary to keep a proper sense of balance. In the first place, there is an all-too-natural tendency to think of such constraints as being deliberate manifestations of U.S. policy. This applies, in particular, to the integrating trend that is being apprehended on the Canadian side. In practice, there is no evidence to suggest that U.S. policy towards Canada is being conducted on other than pragmatic lines as distinct from some general conception of progressive integration that would have the effect of gradually extinguishing Canada's separate existence as a national entity. It is important to distinguish, therefore, between the impact on the Canadian scene of non-governmental U.S. actors (such as corporations, business groups, trade unions, and the media), on the one hand, and of policies and actions of the U.S. Government, on the other. As a general proposition, there is no real evidence that the U.S. Government does now pursue a concerted policy of continental integration in relation to Canada. Conversely, however, the U.S. Government should not be counted on to inhibit any integrating trend that may be emerging as a result of the separate actions or interests of various U.S. constituent communities.

Rewarding relationship

In the second place, the Canada-U.S. relationship, in whatever way we may look upon it, has been a rewarding and enriching relationship for Canada on most counts. In particular, of course, it has been instrumental in endowing Canadians with an industrial structure and the higher standard of living that goes with it in a shorter time span than might otherwise have been achievable on the strength even of Canada's substantial natural and human resources. This is something that cannot be left out of account in any judgment of the constraints the relationship may have placed on Canadian independence. Nor are Canadians disposed to make their reckoning without taking account of the many positive aspects of the relationship. This accounts for the element of ambivalence that has always been a feature of Canadian policy towards the United States. As the recent foreign policy