

suspensions concerning the policy of Allied Governments. While we are entitled to resent this press campaign slandering our motives and intentions, it also represents a genuine and, indeed, a welcome aspect of Soviet policy in its insistence upon the view that "the most urgent problems of to-day are the uprooting of the remnants of fascism, the punishment of war criminals and the continued vigilance of all freedom-loving peoples."

10. If the above survey of the present mood of the dominant elements in the Soviet Union is correct it may well be suggested that the prospects of continued co-operation between the Soviet Union and the western capitalist world are somewhat gloomy. The behaviour of the Soviet Government towards their Allies in the closing stages of the war and, in particular, their high-handed and unilateral actions throughout Eastern and Central Europe, are indeed far from reassuring. They lend colour to the theory that the Soviet State, by its very character and ideological foundation, can never settle down comfortably to co-operate with States with a different ideological basis. Indeed, it might be argued that the Soviet leaders must always have some outside enemy against whom they can concentrate the energies of the Soviet people and so justify the continued demands made upon them. In considering the motives behind the continued criticisms of the outside world and behind the maintenance of complete mobilisation we should not, however, forget that there are great and immediate tasks ahead in restoring the ravages of war inside the Soviet Union, in controlling Germany and in consolidating the newly-won Soviet position in Central and Eastern Europe. It is therefore necessary, given the character of the Russian people, and their natural war weariness, to keep their noses to the grindstone and prevent any slackening in effort. Having regard to possible post-war difficulties, *e.g.*, delays in re-equipment of factories, housing shortages and even a failure of the harvest, it is also necessary to maintain a certain atmosphere of suspicion concerning the outside world, so that blame can be attributed, if necessary, to capitalist and Fascist influences outside the Soviet Union.

11. While it is clear that our relations with the Soviet Union cannot be really comfortable for many years to come, it would, I think, be altogether wrong to conclude that the Soviet Union and its rulers, once Germany and Japan have been eliminated as Great Powers, must substitute for them the British Commonwealth and/or the United States of America as potential enemies of the Soviet Union. It does not follow that, because Soviet propaganda makes outrageous and extravagant attacks upon individuals and groups in England or America, and, indeed, upon certain manifestations of British or American policy, these attacks are necessarily directed against Britain or America as a whole. They are often intended as a warning, or even as useful chastisement, to ensure the elimination of what the Russians regard as poisonous elements in our own and the American political systems. And in this connexion we should remember that the Russians divide the world into friends and enemies and proceed on the principle that he who is not with them is likely to be against them. In pursuing their own national interests and in following Marshal Stalin's instructions to build up the military and economic might of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government are unlikely to show any consideration for our peculiar difficulties and embarrassments. In particular, they invariably suspect our motives when we speak to them in terms of high principle and of moral obligations. But I have seen no signs here of any deliberate intention to fish in troubled waters in India and the colonial empire, nor yet to oppose our interests actively in those countries which are of special strategic importance to us. Soviet forbearance, of course, has its limits, and we receive reminders from time to time that our unwanted intervention in the affairs of Eastern Europe may provoke Soviet reactions elsewhere, but these are reactions to our own policies and not the result of any Soviet initiative against us.

12. In view of the forthcoming elections in Britain and of the many post-war internal problems facing us, it is, I think, reassuring that there are also so few signs (at all events as seen from Moscow) of a Soviet desire to make trouble for us internally in Britain. There seems to be a general, although somewhat hazy, impression here that Britain is, after her own strange fashion, solving her social problems in a progressive way. There is less fear of "reactionary" tendencies regaining influence in London than in Washington. And, perhaps partly because we cannot unaided rival the material strength of the United States of America or of the U.S.S.R., there is no evidence that the Soviet Government desire any weakening in our military power or in our world influence. Although there is still an aftermath, particularly in party circles, of the old suspicion of Britain as the arch-imperialist, opposing Russian expansion throughout the world,