



The Volunteer Review

AND MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

A Journal Devoted to the Interests of the Military and Naval Forces of the Dominion of Canada

VOL. II.

OTTAWA, CANADA, MONDAY, JUNE 8, 1868.

No. 20.

BY THE BEACH.

I heard the solemn flow
Of rhythmic waves upon the stony beach.
I watched them come and go,
Like fleeting thoughts whose depths we fail to reach.

I saw the waste of sea
Looming afar beyond my narrow ken,
Like some deep mystery
Beyond the keen research of thoughtful men.

I watched the billows roll,
Shaping their course in endless tracks of foam,
Like aims that have no goal,
Splitting in froth where'er they yearn to roam.

I heard the dreary cries
And moans of waves that never more depart,
Like sounds of tears and sighs,
Welling from the wild ocean of man's heart.

When low upon the deep
The winged sails of ships dipped peacefully;
Like sudden hopes that sweep
Upon the loneliest and dearest sea.

And then I heard a voice
Of merry children on the noisy beach,
That made the heart rejoice,
And sweetened ocean's sad mysterious speech.

And mingled with the sound,
The laughing sailors, boisterous in their mirth,
Walked answering glee around,
And drove the soul of melancholy forth.

O pitiless waves afar!
O sorrowing echoes from the mournful sea!
There's music in your jar,
To him who understands your mystery.

So let him only hear,
The purling ebb and flow of happier cries,
So that my spirit's ear
May grasp, and keep earth's sweet melodies.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1754-64.

CHAPTER XI.

(Continued from our last.)

None of the honorable brigadiers were good or scientific soldiers, and it is more than probable that Wolfe's perplexity and hesitation on the day of the attack at Montmorenci came from the feeling that he would not be seconded with that zeal and intelligence which is necessary to secure a victory. Monckton and Murray were honest men but of slow intellect. Townshend with more brilliant parts was neither just nor honest, and moreover hated Wolfe. The plan, therefore, which led to the battle on the Heights of Abraham was doubtless, his con-

ception, and it is more than probable with the turpitude common to all public men of his time, it was intended for a trap into which the *parvenu* General should fall, while the subordinates would shelter themselves under the plea that the fault lay in his dispositions. In any case it was the worst and most desperate alternative which could be chosen. First,—Because it involved an attempt in landing from a rapid river at night with a precipice to scale where a company of soldiers could have beaten an army. Secondly,—If repulsed after landing there was no alternative between destruction and capitulation; the naval forces could render no assistance, and to attack the camp they would have to encounter the batteries of the town. Thirdly,—The French if defeated, as happened, had the line of retreat open, could fall back on Jacques Cartier, reassemble and reinforce their army, and assume the offensive at a favorable opportunity with a fair prospect of success, which also happened. Fourthly,—It involved the risk of the destruction of the troops engaged, and did not accomplish what should have been their first object, the total dispersion of the French force and the conquest of Canada in one campaign. And lastly,—It did not prevent the French reaching their magazines, whose losses could be measured by those fallen in fight and an untenable fortress. It would therefore appear that General Wolfe's plan was the proper one to have carried out, as it would effectually accomplish all the Brigadier's proposal failed to do, and was attended with far less risks.

Beyond battering the defences of the Lower town it does not appear the naval forces were generally utilized in the operations of the expedition. It does seem strange that a squadron was not despatched to destroy the magazines at Trois Rivières and thus cut off the French from supplies. This operation alone would have the effect of starving them into a surrender without a soldier putting foot on the Heights of Abraham.

Beyond Murray's abortive attempt nothing more was done. He effected a landing by

surprise at De Chambaud, burnt some magazines, with the spare stores, clothing, arms and baggage of the army, and took a few prisoners from which he learned the surrender of Fort Niagara, and that Ticonderoga and Crown Point was abandoned, the French troops having fallen back to Isle aux Noix, and that General Amherst was building vessels for the purpose of attacking them by descending Lake Champlain—this latter officer did not hear of Wolfe's success till 19th October, when he learnt from a prisoner that Quebec had surrendered on the 18th September.

It is evident that General Wolfe had made up his mind to try the hazard of an attempt on the west of the city, and it is more than probable if the landing was successful, he would have withdrawn his troops to the Isle aux Coudres, and entrenched them there for the winter, by fortifying that point he could have held the passages of the river, and it would be impassable to a French fleet, and he could by reinforcements in the spring be prepared to co-operate with General Amherst's troops in the final conquest of Canada. His biography asserts he had drawn a plan of a fort and other works at the Isle aux Coudres for this purpose. Having adopted the advice of the Brigadiers, the troops at Montmorenci were withdrawn on the 3rd of September, and landed at Point Levi. Immediately on their departure, Montcalm detached Bougainville with 1,500 to watch the movements of the British, especially about the Batiscon, to which point the French ships had moved. He was also obliged to weaken his force by allowing over 2,000 Canadians to retire for the purpose of reaping the harvest.

After a careful reconnoissance of the north shore of the river from Cape Rouge downwards, General Wolfe, fixed on a small basin known as l'Anse du Foulon, from which a pathway carefully entrenched led to the Heights of Abraham above the city, by which the right rear of Montcalm's entrenchments were covered. On the 5th and 6th of September the troops destined for the hazardous attack marched from Point Levi to some distance above the Chaudière where they were embarked on board the ships of