

Communist Bloc,” but he asked for an exchange of views only on the General Assembly’s recommendation to delay the elections in Ruanda-Urundi. Insofar as his appeal referred to the Usumbura incident, it was probably directed to the NATO members of the Security Council, who, as you know, gave some support to the Belgians in that forum.

4. The memorandum also suggests that the Belgian version of the Usumbura incident must be accepted with some scepticism. While this may be true, it seems to me that the Security Council’s refusal to condemn Belgium has a bearing on what position Canada should take if and when the question comes before the General Assembly. The Belgian version of the incident has not been openly challenged by the Western members of the Security Council and their friends. While it might be inadvisable to base recommendations to the Minister on the Belgian version of the incident only, our judgment of the Belgian behaviour must not be based on mere suppositions, even though these suppositions may have some foundation. I would suggest that we try and obtain more information from our United States and United Kingdom colleagues, in the light of the discussion in the Security Council.

W.H. BARTON

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DEA/6385-40

*Note du chef de la Direction européenne  
pour le sous-secrétaire d’État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Head, European Division,  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TOP SECRET. CANADIAN EYES ONLY.

[Ottawa], January 18, 1961

Reference: African and Middle Eastern Division’s Memorandum of January 12, 1961 to the Minister.

#### REQUEST FOR NATO SUPPORT OF BELGIUM’S CONGO ACTIVITIES

We note that in its memorandum under reference, the African and Middle Eastern Division recommends to the Minister that we do not respond to Belgium’s appeal for NATO support of its actions in permitting Colonel Mobotu’s troops to enter the Ruanda-Urundi territory.

2. The recommendation of the African and Middle Eastern Division is based on the following reasons:

*the facts of the incident:* doubt is cast on the Belgian version of what actually happened in the Ruanda-Urundi. – While the Belgians would understandably try to present their case in the best possible light, we do not think for our part that this is a sufficient reason in itself to assume that facts have been distorted. We have heard nothing to this effect from the Americans or the British and the United Nations has not yet provided any such evidence. When this question came to a vote in the Security Council, all NATO powers and non-communist or non-Afro-Asian states sitting on the Council abstained;

*the Belgian case:* the African and Middle Eastern Division argues that Belgium acted contrary to paragraph 4 of the September 20 United Nations General Assembly resolution. – We are not in a position to comment on this assertion but presumably Legal Division or UN Division could offer useful views;

*the Casablanca Conference:* the memorandum under reference contends that the Casablanca Conference did not add significantly to the danger inherent to the situation in the Congo. – While this may be so and while strictly speaking assessing the situation would not come within our responsibilities, it nevertheless seems to us that a potentially explosive situation still prevails in the Congo, particularly in the Orientale Province where efforts are