

Energy

no consensus from the provinces. Consider this government's action in empowering the National Energy Board to control the export of crude oil. In an exchange of letters between Mr. Getty, the Alberta Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, and the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources during the latter part of January—which letters, incidentally, were tabled in the Alberta legislature—the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources said:

I too hope that the matter of ensuring priority for Canadian oil requirements can be handled by the industry itself. In this regard the National Energy Board is keeping in close touch with individual companies and the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board during the current critical period.

He went on to say:

Should a voluntary scheme prove unworkable despite all our efforts, it would clearly be essential for the two boards to consult closely over method, procedures and implementation of a control system.

"Essential" was the word the minister used, Mr. Speaker, yet without that consultation the minister announced to the Standing Committee on National Resources and Public Works, a little over a month later, that effective March 1 the National Energy Board would license all crude oil exports. In his statement to this committee, the minister also said:

● (2120)

The National Energy Board will shortly hold a public hearing in order to provide opportunity for interested parties to be heard as to the appropriate methods for protecting the public interest in respect of all oil exports over the longer term.

No such hearings have been held. I call this inconsistent and vacillating. Consider the question of the Montreal pipeline and the government's vacillations on this subject. In the correspondence between Mr. Getty and the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources to which I have already referred, the Alberta government again made the case for a pipeline to Montreal. In his reply, the minister pooh-poohed the idea. In the green paper on energy tabled in June, the government again indicated their decision that a pipeline to Montreal was undesirable.

Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale): Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. The hon. member has referred to correspondence with the Alberta minister. Would he give the precise dates and indicate when the document was made public?

Mr. Andre: I have already done that. It is right here. The documents were tabled in the legislature of Alberta.

Mr. Baldwin: Will the minister table them here?

Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale): Mr. Speaker, I rise on a question of privilege. The hon. member's assertion that I pooh-poohed the idea of the Montreal pipeline is entirely false.

Some hon. Members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Andre: If the minister cannot remember what he wrote, I will lend him the documents.

Mr. Paproski: Did the minister sign that copy?

[Mr. Andre.]

Mr. Andre: On page 14 of that report the government states:

To date the security threat has not appeared serious enough to justify the very costly arrangements of supplying the region east of the Ottawa Valley with western Canadian crude oil.

Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale): Did Lougheed give the hon. member that?

Mr. Andre: Then, just two months later, before the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East and therefore with no change in the world security situation, but quite a change in the security of the Liberal government, on September 4 the government did another about-face and, contrary to their own advice, decided to build a pipeline to Montreal. We do not quarrel with this decision. It has been the position of our party since October, 1969, that a pipeline should be built to Montreal. Had our advice been taken, we would not be in the situation today of having potential supplies to the Montreal market curtailed.

Consider the question of the short-term supply of crude to eastern Canada, to the area east of the Ottawa Valley. As a result of Arab action, the minister informed the House that Canada could expect a shortfall of possibly 75,000 barrels a day. Shortly thereafter, the minister informed the House that this shortfall could be as much as 200,000 barrels a day. The reason apparently was that some *force majeure* clauses would result in Canada sharing the over-all world shortage. When pressed for clarification on this point by members of this party, the minister's reply to us can only be called equivocal and evasive. Then we found later that the Shaheen refinery at Come-by-Chance will have 100,000 barrels a day of product available to the Canadian market which, when combined with the extra production that can be squeezed out of western Canada, takes care of the whole potential shortfall in this area.

One can only conclude that the minister was either deliberately creating a smokescreen for his own particular purposes or he is so incompetent that he did not know what the situation was. I submit that this country cannot tolerate either situation.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear!

Some hon. Members: Resign.

Mr. Andre: These examples of the inconsistent and vacillating behaviour of the government pale in comparison with the government's incongruous actions with respect to the price of Canadian produced crude oil. On September 4, the Prime Minister announced that the price of Canadian crude oil would be frozen at that level until January 31, 1974, a decision taken with absolutely no consultation in spite of the government's pledges to hold such consultation. Then, because of section 83(c) of the National Energy Board Act which stated that the NEB could not permit any exports at less than fair market price, the government introduced a 40-cent per barrel export tax. Here, again, there was absolutely no consultation. The producing provinces and the industry were understandably angered and the minister, apparently seeking to calm the situation, assured the province of Alberta and the industry, as well as members of this House, that this was all temporary and that western Canadian crude would be priced at the same amount as