

people who moved to Yorkville. That is not a very sensible comparison, but they are the people who are most concerned; there are a vast number and they are people in the cities more than in the countryside.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. FAULKNER: Mr. Taylor, I would just like to clarify your position on the question of recognition. You have described our present position as one of a sterile impasse. Recognition, in your view would, I think, have two advantages. One would hold out a certain option and it would contribute to the ending of the "xenophobia", or the hostility. Are those the specific reasons why you feel we should start a process of recognition which might become more widespread?

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes, I think that is a fair description of the two major results, but I would, again, heavily qualify them. I do not think we count for that much in the world or in China's eyes and it would not suddenly lead to a tremendous change in the Asian tensions, but I think it would be a correct, realistic and sensible move in the right direction of the general Western rapprochement with the Chinese.

Mr. FAULKNER: It would be a sensible move, but in terms of its importance or its impact, it is probably not a terribly important one?

Mr. TAYLOR: In terms of its immediate impact, it is probably not an important move, but in terms of its long-range impact, in terms of the results it might have amongst other Western countries, some of which are in the same situation as we are, in terms of results it might eventually have in the United States where every indication is that public feeling is much more advanced than the feeling in Congress or in the White House on the question of China in all these terms it might be the start of something. It might accelerate the process.

Mr. FAULKNER: The other thing that impresses me—again, if I understood you correctly—in your analysis of Chinese foreign policy is that its basis is far more pragmatic and governed by questions of national interest than it is by ideological factors.

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes, that is very much my viewpoint. I think we tend to over-react to Chinese statements and tend to under-react or under-consider what the Chinese actually do. Their statements are pretty frightening.

Mr. FAULKNER: Then, in your view, statements about items of policy or objectives of policy, such as national liberation wars, are not to be taken at their face value?

Mr. TAYLOR: They are to be studied very carefully to see what the words really mean. If I might just develop this as I think this it is important, the famous document which is so often quoted, especially in Washington, on the *People's War* released in the summer of 1965 by the Chinese Defence Minister, Lin Piao, who is now, of course, heir apparent to Mao Tse-tung, has been called at different times by responsible leaders, "a blueprint for Chinese aggression", "a proof that the Chinese are bent on world domination" and specifically compared of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. This could be said only by people who either have not read it or are guilty of intellectual dishonesty, to put it mildly. If you read that document which has lots of flowery, exciting and frightening phrases about the