

would be available at all times to the inspectors of the international control authority supervising the disarmament programme, in accordance with the terms of the agreement. In the manifold operations of a disarmament supervisory system, there would be some for which a very loose type of inspection would be adequate, whereas for others it would probably be necessary for the officials of the international control organ to have powers comparable to those of management, even though they might not be given formal managerial status.

It was indeed disappointing that even in private and informal talks the Soviet representative not only rejected the new Anglo-French proposals out of hand, but throughout our talks could only with great difficulty be brought to discuss the problem of international safeguards and controls which most of the Western countries regard as a prerequisite of any disarmament. The Soviet representative focused his attention instead almost entirely on a proposal for unconditional prohibition of the use of atomic weapons. Only if we were prepared to agree to an immediate unconditional prohibition of use was the Soviet Government apparently prepared to negotiate seriously with us on the disarmament problem as such.

For reasons which will be abundantly clear, the free world cannot accept in the present state of mistrust and hostility an unconditional prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. By such action we would in effect renounce our right to protect ourselves against aggression, a right which is explicitly recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. That such a proposal should be pressed as a pre-condition to serious negotiation on disarmament is disturbing evidence that the Soviet Government at the present time does not share our determination to reach a settlement. If the Western countries were to accept such a position, they would not only be giving up the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized in the Charter, but they might find at the same time they had accepted an indefinite postponement of the negotiation of the kind of comprehensive disarmament agreement covering prohibition, reduction, and control of all weapons, including nuclear weapons, which is the essence of a workable disarmament programme. It remains our hope, despite Soviet insistence on an unconditional ban on the use of atomic weapons, that they will at some future date accept the proposals set forth in the United Kingdom-French memorandum that all Members of the United Nations should explicitly re-affirm that they regard themselves as prohibited in accordance with the United Nations Charter from the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression. So long as the Soviet Union refuses to acknowledge this Charter obligation, and so long as they continue to insist on an unconditional ban, we can only consider that they find it useful to them as propaganda, and perhaps also as an excuse for not entering into a discussion with us on the heart of the control problem.

As Mr. Norman Robertson, our representative in London, said in the Sub-Committee:

"The reason other countries are so interested in this subject of control is that when they sign a disarmament convention they want to know that all parties will carry out what they undertake to do. They want to know that it will not be possible -- or at all events it will be exceedingly unlikely