

The alarm rung in Korea has increased the urgency of this German problem. It has also led to an intensification of efforts among the countries associated under the North Atlantic Treaty to strengthen their collective defences. The deputies of the Foreign Ministers, members of the North Atlantic Council, have been meeting with a sense of great urgency the last six weeks, and the North Atlantic Council itself will be meeting in New York in about two weeks' time, when they will have some very important decisions to make. My colleague, the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton), will be explaining to the House in greater detail what is proposed by the government in the discharge of our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. I will say no more about it at this time except to state that we will bear our proper share of the burden of collective defence.

The conclusion is forced on us, inevitably, by the situation throughout the world and by the crisis in Korea, that we must increase our own military preparations and help our allies increase theirs. The government accepts that conclusion as the measures to be introduced in this special session will show; measures which are dictated by considerations of national security and, indeed, of national existence.

In all these measures there is no trace of any aggressive purpose. We do not, in this House, I am sure, and in this country, believe in a preventive war; in aggression for peace, or for anything else. Nor do we propose to acquiesce silently when others suggest this course of action. Our job is to play our part, a part determined by ourselves, but worked out in consultation with our friends, in the collective effort of the free countries to prevent aggression if possible, by showing that it cannot succeed; or to defeat it if it occurs.

I would like to emphasize also that it is not the purpose of this government to support any course of policy which will extend the scope of the present conflict in Korea; a conflict which should be confined and localized if it is in our power to do that; and if not, a policy which should avoid giving anyone else an excuse for extending it.

This attitude, we believe, and I feel sure the House will believe, is the only sensible one; first, because we should do everything we can to minimize the risk of a world-wide war; secondly, because we think that it is vitally important that the high degree of unanimity which has been obtained in the United Nations in condemning the aggression against Korea should be preserved, and third, because we should maintain close co-operation between the free countries of Asia and the western world. We understood the reasons for the action of the President of the United States--who has acted so boldly and wisely, if I may say so, throughout this Korean crisis--in ordering the United States fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, and in calling upon the Chinese Nationalist Government in Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. This action seemed to us designed simply to prevent the extension of the conflict in Korea. It was a strategic defensive decision and had, as we understood it, no political implications. We have, however, been disturbed, as I have no doubt others have been disturbed, by reports of preventive military measures taken by the Nationalist government of China against communist concentrations along the mainland coast, as well as by statements reported to have been made by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek concerning United States-