

coupled with an agreement on START, and its May 1987 proposal suggesting 1994, are still on the table. The Soviet Union has put forward a nine- to ten-year proposal.

On 15 January 1988, at the ninth round of the NST talks, the Soviets tabled a draft protocol to the proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty. During the ten-year non-withdrawal period suggested in the proposal, testing of ABM systems and components would be restricted by the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets have insisted on this as a quid pro quo for any START agreement.

The United States rejected the Soviet-proposed Protocol, arguing that a START Treaty should not be tied to restrictions on SDI. On 22 January 1988, the United States presented a draft treaty intended to provide a basis for a transition to a defence-oriented military structure by allowing for development, testing, and deployment of advanced missile defences.

On 22 April 1988, during a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow, the Soviets presented a new draft agreement. However, they have refused to develop a Joint Draft Treaty text, as proposed by the US.

From 24 to 31 August 1988 the third ABM Treaty Review Conference took place. Prior to the Conference, attention was focussed on whether or not the US would charge the Soviet Union with a "material breach" of the Treaty, as possible justification for an American withdrawal from it. Shortly before the beginning of the Conference, however, the United States announced it would postpone its decision until later. The Review Conference ended, unlike its two predecessors, without a joint statement reaffirming the Treaty's aims and purposes. In a related development, in May 1989 the Soviet Union offered to dismantle its Krasnoyarsk radar installation if the United States agreed to a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The offer was refused by the US, however.

The tenth round of the NST ended on 16 November 1988 with no significant progress on the question of defence and space weapons. As a result of its strategic review in early 1989, the Bush Administration declared that it would take a somewhat different approach to the issue of SDI than did the Reagan Administration. This involves a more limited view of what to expect from SDI and lower appropriations for research. In May, the head of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), Lieutenant General George Monahan Jr., stated that certain parts of the programme, including study of a new tracking satellite, a ground-based interceptor rocket, and an orbiting laser, will be delayed for two years.

The programme is now envisaged to have three phases. Phase one, involving sensors and kinetic energy interceptor technologies, could require a decision on deployment within four years. Phase two would involve directed energy weapons, and phase three would include more advanced weapons. The cost of developing and deploying phase one has been estimated at \$69 billion. Since its inception, approximately \$17 billion has been spent on SDI.

Funding for SDI has been reduced by President Bush from that planned by the Reagan Administration. For fiscal year 1990, requests for SDI funds were reduced from \$5.6 billion to \$4.6 billion; funding requests for the next five years were reduced from \$41 billion to \$33 billion. Priority has shifted within SDIO from developing a system of large satellites from which up to ten interceptor rockets each would be launched against