

That is why we consider it advisable to choose a second approach consisting in inventorizing the existing problems, analysing them one after the other in decreasing order of importance, studying what risk, if any, they represent for the sound administration of the convention and, finally, identifying those that constitute acceptable risks in order to concentrate on the delicate cases that it is urgent to resolve. We must abandon the idea of attaining perfection and concentrate on a treaty that would prohibit the rebuilding of chemical arsenals by instituting evolutionary and appropriate surveillance measures such that would-be cheats will find the price to be paid too high.

We are perfectly aware that verification of the veracity of declarations, whether they concern the means of production of chemical weapons or the means of production of chemical products subject to verification, is neither possible nor practicable. We are aware, too, that, whatever their nature, control or verification measures are not perfect. We are prepared to accept the risk this entails, on the assumption that appropriate challenge inspection will play a moderating and dissuasive role.

2. The approach we are proposing is susceptible of application in three spheres:

(a) The lists of substances to be controlled

We are already aware that we shall not be able exhaustively to resolve the question of the inventory of the products that constitute a problem for the convention. After all, the composition of stocks will not be known till after each country's declarations; the latter will be made only at the time of the entry into force of the convention. It is clear, therefore, that the work relating to "non-production" will have to take place in at least three distinct phases: prior to the entry into force of the convention; after the declaration of stocks and of the related means of production; and, finally, during the administration of the convention.

The work to date within the Ad Hoc Committee has enabled the products constituting a risk for the convention to be classified in three categories:

1. Existing chemical weapons
2. Key precursors of supertoxic agents
3. Toxic agents that are or have been part of a chemical arsenal but are manufactured in large quantities for non-hostile purposes.

Definitional criteria have been found. Lists, which are for the moment illustrative, have been compiled. The road is open; it is still long, but the goal is in sight. The toxicity criterion remains a major difficulty, without, however, being an insurmountable obstacle. That criterion does not, indeed, need to be intrinsically precise to be universally acceptable. Its definition will, of necessity, have to encompass the application of the intoxication procedures employed, the characteristics of the animal used (race, weight, sex, etc.), and the measurements to be made.