

temptuous smile by the young, the strong, the virile."* "These be brave 'orts," as Sir Hugh Evans might have said. Do they not give some countenance to Mr. Bradley's sarcastic comment: "This is certainly young, indeed I doubt if at any time of life most of us have been as young as this (Mind, N.S., No. 51, page 310n)? Mr. Schiller, as we shall find, is in a sense a follower of Prof. William James, and it is perhaps a pity that his all too-omniscient air is apt to have the effect of discrediting at once his master and the doctrine he seeks to expound. Let us, however, try to do justice to the "invincible individuality of philosophy," forgetting as far as possible these irrelevant "vivacities," and seeking to understand the character of this new philosophy and its relation to its predecessors. "The longest way round," as the German proverb tells us," is the shortest way home," and I must therefore ask you to have faith that in beginning at a point much earlier than this new "Humanism" we shall perhaps most readily come to see its meaning and the degree of importance which attaches to it.

Professor James, in one of his occasional papers, tells us that Kant is a "mere curio," and that the true apostolic succession of philosophy is through Dr. Reid, Mr. C. V. Pierce and Mr. Shadworth Hodgson. This extraordinary judgment, or lapse of judgment, one may venture to question. To me it rather seems that the philosophy subsequent to Kant takes its origin from him, descending in three separate streams, according as one or other of the aspects of the

Critical Philosophy is emphasized, or perhaps rather over-emphasized. This is not surprising, when one considers that the philosophy of Kant was itself an attempt to effect a union of the empiricism of the school of Locke and Hume, with the idealism of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz, and to do so by combining the point of view of modern science with a defence of morality and religion. In seeking to effect this combination,—to do justice at once to the claim of science that all things are connected together by inviolable mechanical law and the opposite demand of morality and religion that man should lead a free, responsible and ideal life,—Kant was led to draw a bold line of demarcation between Theoretical and Practical Philosophy. Within the former fall the various phenomena included in the system of nature, understanding by "nature" not only things and events belonging to the so-called "external world," but even such inner events as our own immediate feelings and desires. For, in Kant's theory, nothing strictly speaking belongs to the sphere of practice except that which proceeds directly from the will of the agent; and the immediate appetites and desires, which we find welling up within us, no more proceed from our wills than the movement of a stone or the circulation of the blood. Hence, what are ordinarily called "practical" sciences—such as surveying, farming, politics, &c.—are not in Kant's sense "practical" at all: they are merely the application of theoretical rules. The only "practical" science is the science which contains the laws of a free agent; in other words, the sci-

* *Ibid.* p. viii.