## MR. HALDANE'S ARMY SCHEME

but it is essential that we should have one capable of making itself, within some limited area, reasonably disagreeable. The military correspondent of the Times, writing upon the subject of the Russo-Japanese war, pointed out that if, fighting in the water, a shark should get the better of an elephant, it does not therefore follow that the victorious shark should flounder far inland in pursuit. This puts our own case exactly. We have need to be in a position to reap the advantages that naval success may procure for us, but would be foolish to attempt, without allies, really extensive operations on land. Russia was beaten in the Crimea and in Manchuria, and Spain was vanquished in Cuba and the Philippines. There are more ways of reducing an adversary to peace than by the occupation of his capital, and to an island Power possessed of the command of the sea, the alternatives are often many and usually valuable, but there must be land forces capable of utilising them. since otherwise a period of very expensive "stale-mate" must succeed the conclusion of the struggle for naval supremacy.

That we cannot afford to maintain a Regular army large enough to meet the offensive or even the defensive calls that Imperial defence may make upon it, is certain; and the principle that "expansion" from auxiliary sources must consequently be provided is accepted now by so large a majority of the British nation—including Mr. Haldane—that the application of it exactly as now proposed, or in some analogous form, may fairly be regarded as indispensable. What then should be the foundations of a system capable of efficiently providing "powers of expansion outside the limit of the Regular forces of the Crown"? Sir Edwin Collen, Sir Edward Hutton and many other well-known authorities, are of opinion that the situation demands the organisation of our land forces in *three lines*.

First Line.—The Regular army, to maintain order within and upon the frontiers of the Empire, and to be an example in peace and a nucleus in the event of a great war for the auxiliary forces.

3