

tensions of Maine. This is a consequence unavoidable of the spirit of universal electioneering by which the American Government exists.

With respect to political affairs at Washington, to which I have referred above,—how long the present disturbed state of the Government is to last, is a matter of conjecture. The crisis, or convulsion, which was expected to ensue immediately upon the President's veto of the Bank Bill, has been staved off for the moment by the cautious conduct of the federal leaders in Congress, who have resolved, in concert with the President's Cabinet, to make one more effort to effect a compromise. With this view, a new Bank Bill is now in progress through Congress, so shaped as to avoid some of the constitutional objections pointed out in the President's Veto Message. If this bill is approved by the President, a cold reconciliation between him on one side, and his Cabinet and the federal majority in Congress on the other, will take place; but it will not last long. If the President vetoes the new bill, which I think it is generally expected he will do, the rupture will be complete. His present Ministers will resign, and they, and a decisive majority in both Houses will be in open and active opposition to him. He must choose his new Ministry from the minority, either from a small remnant of the federal party, scarcely competent to form an Administration, who side with him in his peculiar opinions upon the Bank question, or, which is more probable, from the Van Buren and democratic party, who were defeated and voted down in so overwhelming a manner in the last general election; one of the main springs of the victory gained over that party having been the Bank question which is now agitated.

Nothing but long continued confusion and discord can arise from this strange complication of affairs. Such a state of things, might not, in ordinary cases, affect the foreign relations of the country; but considering the peculiar character of most of the questions now pending between England and the United States, and the degree to which party spirit, and the principle of state rights, are mixed up with those questions, I am afraid that the uncertain and divided authority which is likely to prevail here, will be anything but favourable to a safe or early adjustment of them.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) H. S. FOX.

Inclosure 6 in No 35.

Mr. Fox to Lord Sydenham.

(Private.)

Dear Lord Sydenham,

Washington, September 7, 1841.

I WROTE to you a private letter by the post, on the 1st instant, the day I received your despatch of the 28th ultimo. My despatch of the same date of the 1st, marked 12, now sent, is partly a repetition of that letter. The correspondence which has passed between Mr. Webster and me, leaves the arrangement still open, and much as it stood before, excepting only the substitution of United States' regular troops, for the Maine posse. I doubt any more precise agreement being at this moment attainable, or perhaps useful, but I will make whatever further attempt to obtain it, either Her Majesty's Government or yourself may think advisable.

Mr. Webster is more friendly, just, and reasonable, than any one I have had yet to deal with here, but then unluckily, on the other hand, he is deplorably timid and helpless, and does not carry with him the weight in the Government that he ought to do.

The instructions to the United States' Officers, which I send you, will, I should hope, effectually prevent any American intrusion into the Madawaska Settlements, and I have been careful to reserve all our rights in that quarter, in my letter to Mr. Webster of the 6th instant. Orders were