

Archibald was assigned to execute it. Archibald entered the office of the bucket-shop keeper and finding evidence showing the character of the business being carried on, he arrested the keeper and all the persons found there, and as was his duty took them to the police station, where they were bailed to appear the next day.

The case was tried before me and the evidence given, and upon the evidence I convicted the defendant. It was appealed to the High Court and the conviction was quashed, and the judge commented very severely upon the conduct of Inspector Archibald, on the ground that Priestman being a respectable man he should not have arrested him, but should have summoned him. In this the judge was absolutely wrong, as the law on the point is very clear and definite. This censure made in open court, and published in the papers, led the defendant Priestman to think that he had a case against Inspector Archibald, and he laid a charge against him before the Board of Police Commissioners to have him dismissed from the force or punished in some way. The Board of Commissioners consisted of the County Judge, the Mayor, and myself.

Priestman came before us and made his complaint that he was arrested instead of being summoned. I said that the law was clear, that Archibald did exactly as the law provided, and that no fault could be found with him. Priestman said that the judge had condemned Archibald severely, and said he had no right to act as he did. I replied that "the judge did not know what he was talking about". This also got into the newspapers, and the judge, the late Judge Rose, brought the matter before the High Court of Justice, and they requested Sir John Boyd, the Chief Justice, to complain to the Attorney-General against me for speaking in that way of one of their number.

Sir Oliver Mowat, Attorney-General, sent the letter to me for my report, which I sent in, pointing out

the law and also pointing out the fact that as a police commissioner I was acting as a judge in a matter which affected the livelihood of a worthy officer who was only doing his duty.

Sir Oliver sent my reply to the High Court of Justice, and they were not satisfied, but wrote another letter referring to "the impropriety of a magistrate commenting disparagingly in a meeting to which the public was admitted, upon observations made by a judge of the High Court while presiding at the assizes; that such a course is not likely to suggest respect for the judicial office or to promote the due administration of the law".

I wrote a very decided reply, for I was determined that, as far as I was concerned, I would show everyone fair play and not be influenced by outside considerations. I said that I had always maintained that it was the duty of the police to enforce the law as they found it, without respect to persons, that if a policeman found any man breaking the law, it was his duty to put the law in force against him without favouritism or consideration for his social position". I went on to say that "we could not leave it to any ordinary policeman to judge of the respectability of a man, and to decide whether one man was to receive greater consideration than another because he was richer or better dressed or better educated or moved in a different social sphere. Mollie Matches, one of the most notorious criminals on this continent, would pass anywhere as an intelligent, well-bred and prosperous business man".

I held that any other system would bring the administration of law into disrepute and the police management into contempt.

I then went on to say that "such a principle as Judge Rose laid down does not exist in any country that I know of—certainly not in England, where one man in the eye of the law has been the same as another from the time that Chief Justice Gascoigne sent Prince Henry to prison down to the other day when the London police ar-