

The abrogated reciprocity treaty with Great Britain, relating to her Canadian dominions, having proved profitable to our northern neighbors and unprofitable to us, it is not wonderful that they should seek in some form an early renewal of its advantageous conditions, nor is it wonderful that we should scan fresh proposals from that quarter with distrust.

The Dominion government maintained during the last session of Congress a confidential embassy at Washington to manufacture or to create a public opinion at our Capitol, through diligent diplomacy and diligent use of the public press, in favor of a new reciprocity treaty; and with so much success that the project, with all the features of its Canadian parentage and British baptism, was at length submitted by the President, as the public have been informed, to the Senate for its advice. It was sent, like the first treaty of Washington, not for our consent, but only for our advice, whether favorable or unfavorable.

It was a high gratification to observe, while examining the details of the proposed treaty and its exclusively foreign origin, that the Secretary of State only formally delivered it to the President and left it without a word of official commendation, as though he was glad to be rid of an unprofitable ceremony. The President of the United States, bound as he is by national and diplomatic comity to treat communications from foreign nations with disguised respect, transmitted the proposal to the Senate, manifesting no marked partiality for the measure, but, while earnestly asking for the opinion of the Senate, frankly declared that he was not himself prepared to say anything respecting its merits. For myself, not being able to find merits, I shall say something upon its demerits, and attempt to show that for what we are to grant there is no adequate compensation in any of the provisions tendered, and that their character, though much confused, cannot be hidden by being huddled together in the form of a treaty.

While considering any new reciprocity proposals the effect of the old treaty should be constantly borne in mind. Our exports to Canada in 1855 were \$20,828,676, but in twelve years under the operation of "reciprocity," or in 1866, they had fallen to \$15,243,834—showing a positive decrease of over \$5,000,000. Yet the exports of Canada to the United States during the same time, which were in 1855 only \$12,182,314, had increased in 1866 to \$46,199,470. The gross inequality therefore was enormous. We furnished to them in twelve years under the treaty a free market for Canadian products to the amount of \$239,000,000, but in return the Canadians only gave a free market to American products to the extent of \$124,000,000. When the treaty began the balance of trade was eight millions annually in our favor, and at the end the balance to be paid in specie was thirty millions in one year against us. That was a reciprocity which cannot be dwelt upon with composure, or that we can afford to have repeated.

ANNEXATION.

One of the collateral questions that will at the outset obtrude itself in the discussion of this treaty is that of the future annexation of the entire country on our northern border. That it would be in many of its aspects—civil, military, and financial—convenient, is not to be doubted. The large sums now mutually expended for defense against future possible border collisions and for parallel lines of revenue offices would be wholly saved and serve to augment the amount which each and every man of the respective countries could retain