

### 3.3.1 The Negotiation Process (Continued)

In addition, the only previous set of arms control negotiations concerning antisatellite weapons, the focus of much of the current military activity and arms control debate, were bilateral in nature. More recently, the US has opposed the multilateralization of outer space arms control negotiations at the CDE in Geneva, partly on the grounds that the most productive and prudent approach would be private US-USSR talks. And the current bilateral approaches between the Superpowers concerning possible other space arms control negotiations are premised on a strictly bilateral negotiating process.

The most plausible scenario for the negotiation of an other space arms control agreement is, therefore a set of bilateral talks. The implications of this for the plausibility of Paxsat as a multilaterally operated verification capability are as follows:

- (a) The precise context of an outer space arms control agreement, together with associated verification and compliance arrangements are likely to reflect a mixture of US and USSR interests, rather than those of third parties.
- (b) It follows that the Superpowers themselves will have to be convinced of the value of a multilaterally operated Paxsat system if this system is to exist in organic connection with an arms control agreement.
- (c) This process will require the multilateralization of a bilaterally negotiated agreement in order to formally link third parties to its provisions.
- (d) The parameters for the operation of Paxsat will have to be embedded in the agreement itself, and therefore the Superpowers themselves must integrate this system into their verification discussions at a relatively early stage. This is not to suggest that specific verification technologies require identification in the agreement, but rather that the legal framework for