

*operational equipment. In this way, potential troop and equipment contributing nations would be made more aware that they alone are the solution in mounting peacekeeping operations, and that by reneging on offers, or providing inappropriate equipment and troops, or by attempting to capitalize on reimbursement or getting equipped, they become part of the problem.*

It should be mentioned in passing that the Secretariat elected not to ask various traditional 'white' TCNs such as Canada for infantry troops. The Secretariat hoped strongly that African countries would put in the majority of troops and that 'white' TCNs would supply communication, transport, medical, and other support units. While this requirement for African line troops may have been theoretically and politically correct, one wonders whether Rwandans would have worried about being protected by all or mostly white troops. Having said that, it is far from clear that any 'white' TCNs would have offered infantry units even if asked. They certainly did not offer them unsolicited.

One of the reasons for the US demanding a review before the second phase of UNAMIR II stemmed from PDD 25's laudable expectation that there be sufficient command and control capacity by peacekeeping field headquarters. In a normal situation, this should be the stance of all TCN's and as mentioned earlier, a standing rapid deployment headquarters would go a long way to reassuring the US and others.

However, Rwanda on May 17th was no longer a normal peacekeeping operation. New Zealand and others argued strenuously that the humanitarian and moral imperatives of events in Rwanda should override what was otherwise a valid criteria for the rapid and full deployment of UNAMIR II. Unfortunately they did not win the day, but then moral suasion, however well premised on righteousness and justice, hardly ever does win by itself.

Rather than attempting to rely solely on moral and humanitarian arguments in future situations, DPKO and interested TCN's such as Canada should investigate in detail the concept being advanced by some<sup>20</sup> of a permanent UN rapid reaction force headquarters. Each such headquarters commanded by a Major General would comprise 50-80 military and civilian staff on 2 year placements with the UN. Based in appropriate locations around the world, they would have the capacity to deploy within 3 to 14 days to the field. For peacekeeping missions, subordinate units with combined personnel strengths of up to 10,000 would be drawn from national forces under stand-by force agreements. These agreements would specify that those units could be assigned to such a headquarters depending on the situation, mission mandate, and national political authorization to deploy. However their tentative designation would allow more sophisticated generic planning and a close association of prospective units within a credible command and control mechanism.

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<sup>20</sup> In September 1993, Canadian Foreign Affairs put forward a concept paper on a permanent rapid reaction force headquarters for the UN, and it is starting to garner support in some UN circles and by various TCNs.