

process of diffusion to others.”<sup>72</sup> As Thomas asks, “What will happen when a real information warfare system confronts ours. Will our capabilities be degraded by a quarter, a third or more?”<sup>73</sup> This might lead, over time, to “more multi-polarity than U.S. leadership of world affairs,”<sup>74</sup> exactly what the RMA is supposed to forestall.

Not surprisingly then, the United States is working on developing counter-measures to the expected “counter-power projection strategies” of targets of American intervention. The *Joint Vision 2010* doctrine “as well as some recent technological solutions for early entry forces,” indicates that the Americans “do not expect the next regional war to present conditions for power projection as auspicious” as those found in the Gulf War.<sup>75</sup> And, according to Thomas, future conflicts may also be very different from the experience in Kosovo:

“Future enemies could possess some of all of the following: an adept air force; up-to-date air defense sites; precision-guided cruise missiles that can do to our bases and planes what we can to theirs (to include destroying AWACs); and the ability to reach the United States with weapons of mass destruction, precision missiles, or terrorists acts. When these threats confront US and NATO systems, what will information superiority do for us? Will it be even more unreliable when stressed by both nontechnical offsets and technological counters?”<sup>76</sup>

The diffusion of technologies has already promoted the search for the next generation of RMA to counter the existing and emerging technologies. From an arms control perspective, it is not the validity of all the claims about the RMA, or the persuasiveness of the many doubts that a revolution is taking place. Rather it is the fact that technologies are being developed which in turn may elicit responses, which will in turn heighten the search for ever more advanced versions of the RMA. In this sense, the proliferation of RMA technologies shares with the nuclear arms race the characteristic that it has acquired a technology driven momentum of its own which may not be entirely related to substantive military or political threats.

## **THE RMA AND ARMS CONTROL: REGIMES, METHODS AND SYSTEMS**

If the RMA has fostered a measure of obscurity and uncertainty, rather than clarity in the future of warfare, it has done no less when it comes to arms control. In part this is the result of the

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<sup>72</sup> As quoted in O’Hanlon, “Beware the ‘RMA’nia,” p. 8.

<sup>73</sup> Thomas, “Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority,” p. 28.

<sup>74</sup> Gongora and von Riekhoff, “Introduction,” p. 18.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> Thomas, “Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority,” p. 28.