


part by incursions from Sudan.³ Similarly, Sudan is engulfed in a civil war, and military spending is unlikely to fall until this is somehow resolved. By contrast, both Mauritania and Morocco may be candidates for international attention, especially in conjunction with attempts to resolve the status of the Western Sahara (for Morocco), and to improve the extremely poor political and economic situation in Mauritania. Certainly a comparison between Mauritania and the other three Sahel states (which are the lowest spenders in percentage of GNP terms) suggests that some room for spending reductions may exist in the Mauritanian case.

A slightly different picture of which states differ from regional norms emerges from Figures 19 to 21, which attempt to tease out any *prima facie* relationships between military and social expenditures, military spending and growth, or the size of the armed forces and civil liberties. In Figure 19, no clear visual relationship seems to exist between the two variables, except that military and social spending again appear to increase more or less in tandem. With respect to the comparison of military and social expenditures, several states in the region score worse than a 1:2.0 ratio of per capita military to social



³ See for more details IISS, *Strategic Survey 1995/96* (London: IISS, 1996), 152-157. For details on the decisions of the late 1980s, see Robert Springborg, *Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); Robert Satloff, *Army and Politics in Mubarak's Egypt* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1988).