

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

movement in this final phase of our negotiations to conclude a chemical weapons convention. It is now quite clear that the basic objective of this convention is fully shared by all, and that there is a general consensus to try and conclude its text within this year. By the end of last year already, the outstanding issues had been correctly and adequately identified, thus charting out the course for the further work to be done by us. Bold initiatives were then taken this year by the President of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador von Wagner, initiatives which earned the respect of all. And yet, the management of the outstanding differences continues to elude us. From what we have seen so far during this first part of our 1992 session, the slender forward movement that took place was quickly ground to a standstill by backtracking to known earlier positions. This has caused disappointment to many, for compromises on the key outstanding elements will obviously have to be made by all sides if we are to work forward towards concluding a convention in the expected time-frame, and which will draw universal adherence.

Let me share our perception of what are some of these major outstanding issues where known differences exist, and where possible compromise solutions have not yet been identified. The verification package that we are developing for the convention has undergone numerous transformations since the negotiations started. In article VI, we have still not been able to agree on the extent to which we would like to monitor the civilian chemical industry. Perhaps this is because of an enthusiasm to create a perfect regime, which has resulted in expanding routine verification well beyond the limited financial and human resources likely to be available to the technical secretariat. Could we not perhaps settle here for a regime which concentrates on schedule I and schedule II facilities which pose the greatest risk to the convention? We must also resist the temptation to introduce new concepts which are alien to the routine nature of the envisaged inspection, or to attempt to use the provisions of this article as a disguised form of challenge inspection.

Article IX on challenge inspection has always been, and remains, the acid test of the convention. Its intrusiveness is crucial to the success of the convention. The acceptance of its intrusiveness will constitute a willing derogation from the national sovereignty provisions of existing international law. Great care has therefore to be exercised to ensure that its essential concepts amalgamate differing points of view and different perceptions of vital national interests. Even though we still have considerable ground to cover before we arrive at an acceptable solution, we have, in considering the four-nation proposal, broken away from the mind-set of the cold war years, and are now embarked on an approach which is realistic and practicable, and which has the potential to command the consensus of the negotiating partners. Nevertheless, three basic elements still have to be addressed before a fully acceptable solution is found. These are, respectively, the role of the executive council, the dangers of abuse, and the question of the observer.

As a geographically representative and permanent sitting organ, the executive council embodies the conscience of the international community's concern regarding chemical weapons. It cannot be bypassed, under any pretext of the need for speed and automaticity in challenge inspections, by a