



possible use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent should the Warsaw Pact forces ever contemplate an attack on the West. At the same time, however, it should be noted that NATO upholds the United Nations Charter which lays down that all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means and that there be no use of force — any force — against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

The proposal would also prohibit the construction of any components of nuclear weapons in Canada. Regarding Canadian co-operation in the production of US cruise missiles, Litton Systems Canada Limited was awarded the sub-contract by the US Department of Defence through its parent company in the United States, Litton Industries, to produce a portion of the inertial guidance system for the cruise missile. Litton's participation in a small part of the cruise missile vehicle program should not be taken as a change in Canadian policies instituted at the end of the 1960s to divest our armed forces of a nuclear weapon capability. It is, however, consistent with joint defence efforts with our NATO allies who rely in part on the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent in the face of the growing military threat from hostile forces.

The proposal before us today also calls for the Government to encourage cities, provinces and states throughout the world also to become nuclear weapons free zones. While someone else will speak on the question of regional nuclear weapons free zones, I would like to comment on the question of Canadian cities and provinces declaring themselves nuclear weapon free zones. We recognize that there is an important symbolic value in the declaration of a nuclear weapons free zone as an expression of the desire of mankind to be free from the threat of nuclear war. However, any responsible Government must look at the real implications of what a nuclear weapons free zone means from the point of view of security."

Major Canadian Statement at MBFR Negotiations

Negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, involving 12 members of NATO and the seven Warsaw Pact members, began in Vienna in 1973 as a result of a NATO initiative to reduce the military manpower of East and West in Central Europe to equal, significantly lower levels. NATO participants include all members of the Alliance except Spain, Portugal, France and Iceland; all Warsaw Pact member countries are represented. The agreed goal is the reduction of each side's military manpower in the "zone of reductions" to parity at a level of 700 000 ground force personnel and a maximum of 900 000 air and ground force personnel combined. The zone of reductions consists of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries on the Western side, and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the Eastern side. In addition to these reductions, the West seeks certain "associated measures" that could facilitate verification, build confidence and enhance stability.

Following is an excerpt from a major statement made at the MBFR negotiations on May 15, by the Head of the Canadian delegation, Mr. Michael Shenstone.

"Mr. Chairman,

It will surprise no one around this table to hear that the thirty-eighth Round which ended on March 20 was a great disappointment to the West, and one which we did not expect. After the major initiative tabled by the West on December 5, 1985, the sides found themselves for the first time in the long history of these negotiations agreeing to a common framework. In this initiative, the West made a historic move demonstrating its political will to create conditions favourable for reaching an agreement. While many substantive issues remained, we had genuine hope that the East might muster similar political will to match the West's concession and that subsequent work could expand the areas of common ground so as to bring an agreement finally within reach.

These expectations were raised even higher by public statements of Eastern leaders that seemed to augur a new willingness to negotiate effective verification.

As the Round unfolded, however, the West found its Eastern partners reluctant to work on a common agenda for progress. Instead, the East advanced what was described as a further development of its earlier Basic Provisions. Despite the dazzling merits claimed for this package, the East demonstrated an embarrassed reluctance to answer several repeated questions from the West for clarification. When partial answers were eventually extracted from our Eastern colleagues, it became clear why they were embarrassed: to back up the high rhetoric of its advance publicity, the East grudgingly unveiled verification measures that failed to demonstrate even the slightest substantive improvement over its previous inadequate measures. On one specific measure, the application of exit-entry points, the East revealed a position which politeness compels me merely to describe as a backward step.

This development, far from building upon the opportunities created by the West's acceptance of a common framework, only imposed yet another obstacle to progress in Vienna.

The West reviewed this unfortunate turn of events in its closing plenary on the 20th of March. It urged its Eastern colleagues to re-examine their former positions on key subjects such as verification and return to the thirty-ninth Round with constructive proposals that would match the Western move of December 1985. The West expected, of course, that if any progress were to be achieved in the period ahead, Eastern proposals would need to relate to the context of the hard-won convergence onto the common framework for a first-phase, time-limited agreement on initial US and Soviet reductions and a no-increase commitment — an agreement along the lines of the Basic Provisions