

will say with a sputter, "to all this hocus-pocus. I am not going to have the wool pulled over my eyes in that way. You may call your transcendentalism psychology if you like, but I will none of it. By psychology I mean the science of the *individual* consciousness, and you tell me that there is *no* individual consciousness, but only the universal realizing itself in the individual. You mean that my consciousness is God in me. Say so if you like, but don't call your metaphysics psychology!" And really, you know, the English psychologist has some ground of complaint. To have one's theory turned upside down, and to be calmly told that it is still the *same* theory, seems an outrage, naturally provocative of strong language. Let us see, however, how our young friend performs the trick of conjuration by which the plain stubborn English psychologist, who prides himself on "sticking to facts," is made to discourse with honeyed mouth of Absolute Idealism.

Enter Locke, "I thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a view of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted (Book i., ch. 2, §7.)" Now hear Mr. Dewey's interpretation of the passage: "We are not to determine the nature of reality, or of any object of philosophical inquiry by examining it as it is in itself, but only as it is an element in our knowledge, in our experience, only as it is related to our mind, or is an 'idea.' As Prof. Fraser well puts it, Locke's way of stating the question 'involves the fundamental assumption of philosophy, that real things as well as imaginary things, whatever their absolute existence, exist for us only through becoming involved in what we mentally experience in the course of our self-conscious lives, (*Berkeley*, p. 20.) Or, in the ordinary way of putting it, the nature of all objects of philosophical inquiry is to be fixed by finding out what experience says about them. Now that Locke having stated his method, immediately deserted it, will, I suppose, be admitted by all. Instead of determining the nature of objects of experience by an account of our knowledge, he proceeded to explain our knowledge by reference to certain unknowable substances, called by the name of matter, making impressions on an unknowable substance, called mind. Any attempt to shew the *origin* of knowledge or of conscious experience, presupposes a division between things as they are for knowledge or experience, and as they are in themselves." But this is "a meaningless and self-contradictory conception of the psychological stand point."

All this is very ingenious and subtle, but is it sound? We fear that John D., like Joey B. in Dickens' story is "aly, sir," (the reader may mentally supply the rest.) But, after all, what does it come to but this, that Locke and Mr. Dewey both appeal to conscious experience, but mean by conscious experience the exact opposite of one another? Let Locke's "conscious experience" = x, and Mr. Dewey's = not-x; then the one appeals to x, and

the other to not-x. Really, the two Johns are at daggers drawn, and it is only politeness or finesse in the one to say that they are fighting on the same side. We don't think that our young friend, charm he ever so wisely, will set to sleep the English psychologist's ever watchful distrust of Absolute Idealism. That line of policy we believe to be a losing game. We prefer the method of Heine, who said that "he always called a spade a spade, and Herr Schmidt he called an ass." An *eirenicon* based on the principle of shearing away all differences, and calling the beggarly remnant truth, is not likely to succeed. It has recently been tried in another realm by the author of *Ecce Homo*, in his "Natural Religion," where it is claimed that even to admit "Nature" is to accept the foundation of religion, but we doubt if "Natural Religion" has convinced either the one side or the other. So here when Locke proposed to "take a view of our own understandings," he assumed that there is a reality with which mind has nothing to do, and his problem was to find out how far our human intelligence can bring us into contact with such reality. Mr. Dewey says that, "having stated his method, he immediately deserted it." Not at all: he followed his own method, *as he understood it*. You change his method, and then you say that he "deserted it." In short, "experience" is one of those ambiguous words that may mean anything. When we know the sense in which it is used, then we know what it means. In Locke, and his English followers, it means "states of the individual consciousness," as opposed to things in themselves; in Mr. Dewey's use of words, it means the consciousness of things in themselves. No amount of leger-de-main can reconcile two such opposites. We do not hesitate to say that Mr. Dewey has "misinterpreted the stand point of British philosophy."

In next issue we may have a word to say on his view that psychology is the method of philosophy. Meantime we cordially recommend both articles (*Mind*, Nos. 41 and 42) to all interested in philosophical speculation.

A SCHOOL OF SCIENCE.

BY PROF. W. L. GOODWIN.

IT is acknowledged by all who have given the subject careful consideration, that, other things being equal, the arts and manufactures flourish most vigorously in countries where liberal provision is made for diffusing a knowledge of the principles and applications of science. Many facts might be adduced to illustrate this. English calico printers have come to the conclusion that they are falling behind the United States manufacturers, and this is ascribed to the superior general and technical education of the American artisans. Probably the best instance is that of the sugar industry. Formerly, sugar was almost exclusively manufactured from the sugar-cane, which flourishes only in tropical countries. The process employed was a comparatively rude and wasteful one. Very little progress was made—improvements suggested them-