

turn the power and accuracy of their armament to the best account. No round must fall ineffective or without an object. Hitting must be the sole end and object of the gunner's training; and, if anything interferes with that part of his education, it must ruthlessly be swept away and forgotten.

We no longer should hear of the "best horsed" or "best dressed," but only of the "best shooting" battery or troop. Mobility, as we have before pointed out, is not now so important a qualification as excellence in shooting, and much of the trouble formerly lavished on drill movements and evolutions must now be turned in a more useful direction. We often plume ourselves because our artillery is supposed to be the best in the world. It is undoubtedly the best horsed and the best dressed. It may also now be said to have in the 12-pounder at any rate as good a gun as that of any other state, and, as regards the physique of its men (*pace* Sir Edward Sullivan and "Army reformers"), it may also claim equality, if not superiority. But if we take account of its capabilities of destruction, we are not sure that we can boast of first place. This should be ours. Englishmen are keen of sight and observation, and if trained in the right direction, can excel here as in other respects. Unfortunately, we have as yet hardly adopted methods calculated to call forth the best powers of our men. Until quite recently, few cared to inquire how a battery shot if it only looked and moved well on parade. Practice was regarded as a nuisance, and gunnery was voted a decided bore. Much of this spirit has disappeared, but much has still to be got rid of, and until the last remnants of it have been lost sight of we can hardly hope to have a really efficient artillery.

A fortnight ago, we pointed out that the advances made in firearms and equipments will more than ever accentuate the value and importance of artillery fire. Its scientific use will have to be studied with the same care that is devoted to any other portion of the military art, and it will no longer be looked upon as sufficient if the guns can only make a noise, and by their presence produce what is called moral effect. Their effect may be moral, but it will most certainly have to be physical too if the infantry are to make any headway or drive back the advancing foe. Its distribution in masses on the battle-field will have to be arranged for, and the positions it is to occupy chosen with foresight and judgment.

When Sir Frederick Roberts alluded to the possibility of a collision with Russia on the frontier of India, he was indulging in no imaginary flights and raising no false bogies to frighten us into activity. In India, we are living in much the same state of anxiety as are the French and Germans on the Continent. We are, as it were, in the presence of the enemy, and can indulge in no day-dreams as to the unlikelihood of war. That is a real danger, and soldiering has a practical ring about it in India that it lacks in England. When, therefore, the man in all India best qualified to know both the danger and the remedy bids us endeavour to get the most out of our weapons, we trust his words will go home to those to whom they are addressed, and be remembered as the hints of a practical man on a practical subject deserve to be treasured up. As long as we had only Asiatics to fear, our somewhat careless methods carried little danger with them. Our worst was always better than our opponent's best. Now, however, we must work to a higher standard, and having given our artillery the best possible equipment, must insist on extracting the very best possible results from the weapons in their hands.

Sir Frederick's reasoning, moreover, is of wide application and comprehensiveness, though it is of artillery in particular that he speaks. The magazine rifle must also be made the most of, and a better effect striven for from the fire of our battalions. Fire discipline is the watchword that must here guide our efforts, and, as in the case of artillery, the more showy side of soldiering must be sacrificed to produce it. Victory no longer "lies in the legs," but in the sights and ammunition.

The Palace of Laeken met with destruction by fire on New Year's Day. The historical reminiscences attaching to this late residence of the King of the Belgians, include an item of some general interest. As known, the edifice was once the property of Napoleon I., who lived in it for a space with the Empress Josephine, and signed within its walls the declaration of war against Russia. He must have liked the lodgings, for he desired to return to them on the 17th June, 1815. On that day, when Wellington, with the British forces and their allies, stood ranged on the plateau on Mont St. Jean to await the French onset, Napoleon is stated to have remarked to Marshal Soult, *Enfin je les tiens, ces Anglais!* ("At last I have got them—these English!") but the latter commander, who had already some experiences in Spain and Portugal of the value of the enemy in front, surlily muttered some words to the effect that as his sire had got them, he would have to keep them—if he could. Ever confident of his nimbus of victory, before even a shot of the opening battle had been fired, Napoleon despatched messengers to Paris with the advices that he had come up with the English, and after disposing of their opposition to his advance on Brussels, intended "to sup the same night at Laeken!" As it proved, the "smoker" song was sung, but that night Napoleon had no supper at all.

Some Thoughts on Cavalry.

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We hear a good deal about cavalry being "the eyes of an army," about its "hovering on the flanks of the enemy," making raids, foraging, skirmishing, preparing the way for combat by the infantry and cannon,—in short anything and everything except downright hard fighting in battle. We hear it also asserted (and with much truth) that the old time cavalry charge in heavy massed formations, as against infantry armed with the modern rifle, is a thing of the past, never to be resorted to unless the sacrifice of the cavalry is thus demanded to gain precious time in some battle emergency.

But nevertheless it is believed by the writer that the sphere of cavalry as an active independent force, supported by its own proper horse artillery, and fighting in large bodies against either foot or mounted troops, is by no means at an end, so far as wars in the future are concerned. As long as the achievements of the cavalry corps of the army of the Potomac under General Sheridan remain to adorn the page of history, the brilliant military possibilities of a large mounted corps acting independently against an equal, or even superior force of infantry, in a rough and new country like ours, will and must arrest the attention of army organizers of the future.

One mistake made with our cavalry now is to handicap it with a bungling and inadequate equipment, fit only for cavalry, and not for dragoons, and at the same time to expect from it, and exact from it, dragoon service. Our cavalry should be transformed into dragoons and be used only as dragoons.

The original and true meaning of the word "dragoon" is a soldier who can fight equally well on horseback or on foot as necessity may require. In the old army of the United States there were two regiments of dragoons and one of "Mounted Riflemen," so called. Later (in 1855) two regiments of cavalry were added. Early in the war (to the great disgust of the dragoons and mounted riflemen), all were merged into five uniform regiments of horse, and were called "cavalry."

Thus the new volunteer regiments were called cavalry also, and with the regulars, were armed with short, pop gun carbines, and their efficiency further destroyed by being told off into small squads for escort, courier and "orderly" duty. So it came to pass that the infantry volunteers used in joke to offer a reward for a "dead cavalry-man." But let it be noted that whenever the cavalry had a chance to act in large bodies and together they made splendid records. Yet they had few such chances until near the end of the war of the Rebellion, when Sheridan massed the cavalry of the Potomac Army into a corps and used them as they should be used, viz., as dragoons.

Towards the end of the war, too, the cavalry obtained better guns, or many regiments did, such as the Henry or Spencer rifle, both breech loaders and magazine guns.

Some noble attempts were made early in the war to use the cavalry as they should be used in fighting, notably by Maj. Gen. John Buford, who had he lived, would surely have shown the world as Sheridan did later on, how much cavalry could accomplish in a new country like ours, of heavy timber, rough hills and poor roads, when they were used as dragoons, *i.e.*, manœuvred while mounted and fought while on foot.

The cavalry of Russia has the same or similar difficulties of rough, new and broken country to operate in, as our own. It contends with the enemy in large, independent brigades or corps, in regions where long marches, lack of roads and other impediments of a wild region render the manœuvre of infantry impossible, because under the given conditions, celerity of movement by infantry is impossible.

Let it be noted that all the regular cavalry of Russia, 57 regiments and 56 depot squadrons, numbering over 95,000 men, have been transformed into dragoons, armed with long rifles and especially trained to fight on foot. In target practice many of these regiments are equal to the infantry. How absurd it is to compare, as some military critics are prone to do, the operations of cavalry in an open, highly cultivated country of turn-pikes and macadam roads, like France, for instance, with the operations of mounted men in a country like the wilderness of Virginia, the Tennessee mountain region or the bad lands of North Dakota. There is, and can be no parallel. Cavalry armed with short carbines as an auxiliary to the sabre may do great things in the fair fields and vineyards of sunny France. On the steppes of Asia, in the rough mountains and forests of Tennessee, in the labyrinths of the bad lands, among the wild buttes of Montana, cavalry must act as dragoons, and should be armed with the long rifle.

It has been a matter of wonder among the Indians of the plains for a quarter of a century that our horse soldiers are given the short guns to fight with. They very pertinently ask, "if the Great Father at Washington has not got enough long rifles for all his soldiers, why he does not give the short guns to his foot soldiers and the long guns to his horsemen?"