

of course, have put some fresh life into their decaying cause, and they would at least have been then in a position to assure the Imperial Government that Nova Scotia had not been conciliated. To secure this result they employed all the means in their power; they strove, tooth and nail, to win the contest; relays of speakers and their *daqueurs* followed Mr. Howe throughout his canvass. They nearly cost him his life, for he was in ill-health at the time; but he won his election by a large majority. Once again—and finally—the Repealers were defeated, and once again they had no alternative policy ready to meet the emergency. It is, perhaps, not in human nature, certainly not in Colonial politicians' nature, candidly to acquiesce in a defeat, and to follow an enemy's lead; but there are occasions on which in honesty either such must be done, or something else must be, at least, attempted. In the present case the Repeal party did neither. They seem to have taken refuge in sulks, and they made their case as bad as they possibly could, by accepting the increased subsidy while they would not accept their defeat. The members of the Local Government, with the exception of Mr. Annand, and of Mr. Vail, the Provincial Secretary, (who, by his manners and evident honesty, made a very favourable impression when he once or twice visited Ottawa,) are entirely unknown in Canada; but we may fairly argue that they were, as a whole, of little ability and vigour. For this was an occasion to which men of political *stamina* or moral courage would certainly have risen. They would have either done something for Repeal, or they would have spent the next two or three years in useful works and needed legislation, instead of (politically) wasting them in discontented apathy, meaningless regrets, and powerless hate.

These, then, are, we think, the main facts, which we have taken some trouble to compile from many sources, oral and written, of the Anti-confederate campaign in Nova

Scotia. In small communities it is often a small event that decides a great issue, and a question involving a great principle is frequently settled by the influence of some personal or local association. And so, to some extent, it was with the Repeal movement in Nova Scotia. The result was reached not so much through a calm and dispassionate weighing of the merits of the case, as by the day-by-day effect of thoughts, words and acts, which outwardly made little show, but which sunk into the hearts and ruled the conduct of those who, if not the ostensible leaders, yet supplied the power on which the movement rested. In selecting the chief points, and noting what appear to us the main events, we have omitted much that to others, and especially those on the spot, may seem noteworthy. And into the principle that underlies the Confederation policy we have not entered—for happily that is now a dead issue; neither have we touched on the grievances in detail of which Nova Scotia complained, nor discussed the justice, wisdom or necessity of the "better terms" accorded to her. There are numberless occurrences, endless speeches and infinite propositions which we have not chronicled, and which seemed at the time to be of some moment, and which attracted some attention. But we have recorded all the incidents that materially affected the issue of the contest, and we have brought the narrative down to the practical close of the fight; at the time when the sponge *ought* to have been thrown up. Before closing this article, which has hitherto dealt with what *has been*, we may fairly add a few words on what *might have been*, the result of the Repeal movement.

It is rarely, we imagine, that one party is so completely successful, or that a policy is so unmistakably supported, as was that of the Anti-confederates at the General Election in September, 1867. Why, then, were its objects not attained? Why was the whole movement so entirely devoid of results? In the first