

active demand for tonnage to all parts of the world. It is indeed to us a home picture—the only one we trust to have for many years to come—of the widespread evils of war in modern days. But it is a picture quite unique in its nature, for the nation to which these seventeen fine ships belong has a navy perhaps second only to Great Britain, and the enemy with which she has to cope is but a schism from herself, possessed of no port that is not blockaded, and owning not more than five or six vessels on the high seas. The tactics with which the Federals have to combat are without precedent, and the means to enable them successfully to do so have not yet been devised.”

It is well to remark, that at the time this was written the naval force of the Federals consisted of about 700 ships and some 40,000 men! Yet it was not equal to preventing the interruption of American commerce in distant seas, although it maintained a strict blockade of the enemy's ports. Now Singapore was a neutral port, and therefore afforded protection to the Federal vessels; but where are the available ports likely to be neutral, along our lines, to afford protection to our commercial fleets under similar circumstances? The natural rendezvous of commercial fleets are in our possession, and could only afford protection in proportion to their means of defence.

By securing bases of operation for our war fleets, we also provide safe refuge for our traders at places where it is most required. If ever we are in real danger of invasion, we shall be actually engaged in a naval war: we shall not have the excuse that the tactics we have then to combat “are without precedent,” but we may bitterly regret that the means “to enable us successfully to do so have not been devised,” not from the lack of power, but from want of will.

While it is essential to guard the strategic points from capture by military force, it is equally necessary to secure their resources from destruction by bombardment from the sea; and in many instances military force would be—from natural circumstances and situation—powerless to prevent such a contingency. The destruction of several coal depôts might be accomplished in a few hours by a single ship with very few guns; and heavy requisitions, on pain of instant bombardment, might be hastily levied on a fleet of merchantmen within an hour by “an intelligent maritime Valer” in the shape of an insignificant cruiser, even in the presence of military force. This danger can in several instances only be met by port defences, vessels, and torpedoes. A very small local force, if trained and provided with these weapons, would meet the requirement. But where are the weapons? Where is the force? It will be too late to await the outbreak of war to provide the weapons and to train the force, for an attack on our coal depôts at the strategic points will not be the last, but the first act in the drama of future war. The means for their destruction are always at the disposal of any maritime power, but the measures for their adequate defence take much time to develop. A single cruiser bringing her guns to bear on one of our coal depôts, would in a few hours paralyse the action of our fleet for months.

It is not possible here to enter more fully into details respecting the defence of the Imperial roads, which is the first, and can be made the strongest line, of Colonial defences. In no way can our Colonies and possessions be so efficiently protected as by

a firm command of their communications, for with the exception of Canada and India they would thus be exempted from the possibility of attack, and unless Canada and India are to be cut off from succour and support, their communications must be held, come what may.

The lines of Colonial defences may be thus summarized:—

1. The defence of their communications, which involves fortifying the imperial strategic points and the existence of a purely naval and a purely military force; the one equal to the task of keeping open the roads between the points, the other sufficient to secure those points from capture in the necessary absence of the fleet.

2. The interior line of sea-defence, which must provide against the destruction, by bombardment from the sea, of naval resources at the strategic points in cases where that object cannot be secured by land batteries and military force. It also includes similar provision for the protection of Colonial mercantile ports to prevent their commercial reduction by enormous requisitions.

3. The defence of the soil of all Colonies and places not necessary to the Empire as military and strategic positions.

Having thus briefly viewed the nature of our requirements, it is desirable to draw some practical conclusions as to how they can best be met.

The communications of the Empire being the common property of all its component parts, each portion, according to the use it makes of them, has a direct interest in their defence, and should contribute to that object.

The forces intended for the defence of the communications must be Imperial, and not Colonial. They must be prepared to act at any point on the Imperial lines where they may happen to be required. Naval Colonial forces created under the Naval Defence Act of 1855 are only of value, and that to a very limited extent, to meet the necessities of the second or interior lines of Colonial Defence.

The force necessary for the defence of the Imperial communications should be under the control of one directing head. As military force is necessary for the support of naval power, as is in our case military is in its turn dependent upon a naval power, the distribution of the one must have reference to that of the other. If, therefore, the military force is under the control of one department, and the naval force under that of another, the defence of our communications is, to use a homely phrase, “between two stools.” In vain might our “Admiralty” despatch fleets to distant seas, if the bases of their operation are not secured by the “War Office,” equally valueless would be the distribution of military force for the protection of those places by the War Office, if the Admiralty do not keep the communications between them open. Unless there be a war minister responsible for, and controlling the general principles which should govern the action of each department, nothing but confusion can result when the Imperial communications are in danger.

If the Colonies are really in earnest in matters relating to their defence; if it is time they should combine to force on the attention of the Imperial Parliament the neglected state of the Imperial roads, and the necessity for devising adequate means for their security. They must, however, be prepared to bear their fair share of the burden.

(To be continued.)

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parted with his early faith in such a Monarchy as that which the *Wing Revolution* planted in England. At the age of eighty-six his opinions are much the same as they were at the age of twenty-five. A professor then, he is a professor still, although he has no chair, and lectures only with his pen. He is still a doctrinaire and a Royalist. While his old and flexible rival, M. Thiers, has been converted to the belief that peace can be brought to France by a Republic alone, M. Guizot is as rigid as ever in his Louis Philippism. Born a Protestant, he is a Protestant still, and instead of growing more Liberal with years, he has become more Puritan. It was he who led the orthodox party in the Protestant Consistory last year, and he has been trying to induce the Council of State to put the Liberal Protestants out of the Church. If consistency be a virtue, M. Guizot merits a high place among the saints. But, whatever may be said of his faults and his failings, the fact remains that stands among the most remarkable men of his time, and that his life is an object of interest to Europe as well as to France.

The *Broad Arrow*, in criticising some of the weak points of the “new drill,” notes the following as among its peculiarities: The captain of a company is no longer a mere guide, but is posted where he can be of real use in superintending his command. Yet the field officers are still encumbered with the cares of dressing and covering. The sword is returned in skirmishing, yet it is still carried drawn to the great inconvenience and even danger of its bearer, in battalion movements, when the troops are not firing, nor even supposed to be in sight of the enemy. Several terms and words of command have been assimilated to those in use in cavalry. The difficult and intricate “countermarch by ranks” is retained instead of the simple and speedier “countermarch in files” or “fours.” In marching past in quarter column, the troops armed with the long rifle are to carry it at the trail instead of at the slope. The long process of teaching recruits their “fours” could, our contemporary urges, be much condensed by simply instructing them to form *fours-deep* at once at the word “Fours” and then to turn as required on getting the further command “Right,” “Left,” or “About.” Criticising the useless subtleties of the drill, it says: He has to remember (1) whether he is in front or rear rank; (2) a right or left file; (3) an odd or even number; (4) the number of his company; (5) of his half company; (6) of his section, and whether he is in a right or left half battalion or company; (7) which is his proper front; with many other things “too numerous to mention.” Is it desirable or expedient to add to this load on his mind, simply for the sake of show, or to save his officer's breath.

Philadelphia despatches confirm the statement that the children of the dead Siamese Twins have consented that their remains shall be sold to medical authorities for scientific purposes. Dr. Hollingsworth having arrived from North Carolina with that object in view. Physicians in New York and elsewhere will contribute towards raising the sum required, which is believed to be about \$10,000.