his seal is considered more sacred than what he may say. Hence, each witness is required to make a declaration to the effect that with a mind free from bias in favour of or against either of the litigating parties, and with perfect fairness, he will give evidence, and, after this has been read out by the recorder of the court and handed to the witness in the form of a document, the latter is expected to affix his seal to it. The same plan is adopted with the statement of facts which, in the course of the examination he undergoes, a witness makes in court. The purport of his evidence is written out by the recorder, and before leaving the court he is required to make what corrections are necessary to render the written statement a trustworthy record of his evidence, and to guarantee its correctness by affixing his seal. Though this process occupies a good deal of time, it precludes the possibility of the evidence given being incorrectly reported, which, in trials where the decision of the court depends largely on oral evidence, is a matter of much moment.—*Law Journal.*

LITERARY THEFT.—In relation to literary theft the editor of the *Nineteenth Century* has published, in a recent number of his magazine, an emphatic condemnation of the "monstrous extent to which an organized system of plunder is carried on in certain quarters." "Under pretence," writes he, "of criticism and the transparent guise of sample extracts, the whole value of articles and essays—which may and frequently have cost a review hundreds of pounds—is offered to the public for a penny or even a halfpenny," and he adds that "a determination has been arrived at to make an example of such pilferers." The cases are numerous in which the defence of literary piracy on the ground of "comment, criticism, or illustration" has been unsuccessfully raised. Perhaps the best example is *Campbell* v. *Scott*, 11 Simon 31. In that case (as cited in "Scrutton on Copyright," 2nd ed., p. 123) the defendant had published a volume of 790 pages, thirty-four of which pages were taken up with a critical essay on English poetry, while the remaining 738 pages were filled with complete pieces and extracts as illustrative specimens. Six poems and extracts, amounting to only 733 lines in all, were taken from copyright works of the plaintiff, who obtained an injunction against the continued publication, on the ground that no sufficient critical labour or original work on the defendant's part was shown to justify his selection. Not a few of these thieves think that an acknowledgment of the source from which they steal will excuse them. This view is quite unsound, as was shown by *Scott* v. *Stanford*, 36 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 729. There the plaintiff had published certain statistical returns of London imports of coal, and the defendant, "with a full acknowledgment of his indebtedness" to the plaintiff, published these returns as part of a work on the mineral statistics of the United Kingdom, the extracted matter forming a third of the defendant's work. "The court," said Vice-Chancellor Page Wood, "can only look at the result, and not at the intention," and he granted an injunction without hesitation. Similarly, the verbatim extracts from law reports in *Sweet* v. *Benning*, 16 C.B. 459, which Chief Justice Jervis described as a "mere mechanical stringing