to show that the defendant had sold intoxicating liquor on those days. The magistrate adjudged the defendant guilty, and made a minute thereof and of the punishment imposed. A few days afterwards he returned a conviction of the defendant for having sold liquor without a license on the two days named; and a month later returned a second conviction as for an offence committed on the 31st only.

Held, that the information charged two offences, and it and the proceedings thereon were in direct contravention of s. 26 of the Summary Convictions Act, R.S.C., c. 178; and that the misjoinder of the two offences was not a defect in substance within the meaning of s. 28.

Rodgers v. *Richards*, [1892] 1 Q.B. 555, not followed.

Hamilton v. *Walker*, [1892] 2 Q.B. 25, referred to.

Held, also, that the objection to the information and subsequent proceedings was open to the defendant upon motion to quash the convictions, although it was not taken before the magistrate.

Held, lastly, that, under the circumstances, neither s. 105 of R.S.O., c. 194, nor ss. 80, 87 & 88 of R.S.C., c. 178, as amended by 53 Vict., c. 37, applied to the convictions.

And the convictions were quashed, with costs to be paid by the prosecutor.

Tremeear for the defendant.

Langton, Q.C., for the magistrate and prosecutor.

Div'l Court.] [Feb. 6.

IN RE WASHINGTON.

Medical practitioner—College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario—Erasure of name from register—R.S.O., c. 148—Disgraceful conduct in a professional respect—Advertising—False representations to patient—Publishing symptoms of disease—Committee of council—Evidence—Report.

Upon an appeal by a registered medical practitioner, under R.S.O., c. 148, s. 37, as amended by 54 Vict., c. 26, s. 5, from an order of the council of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario directing that the name of the appellant should be erased from the register, it appeared that the appellant had advertised extensively in newspapers and handbills, setting forth and lauding in extravagant language his qualifications for treating catarrh, showing that that disease led to consumption, stating the symptoms of it, and giving testimonials from persons said to have been cured by him.

Held, that mere advertising was not in itself disgraceful conduct in a professional respect; but that the advertisements published by the appellant were studied efforts to impose upon the credulity of the public for gain, and were disgraceful in a professional respect within the meaning of s. 34 of the Act.

It appeared also that the appellant had represented to two persons, who were, in fact, in the last stages of consumption, that they were suffering from catarrhal bronchitis, and that he had power to cure them, and had taken money from them upon the strength of such representations.