

the defence of Europe. However, I do want to add a word of caution. Our existing capacity to transport forces to Europe within a meaningful time-period is limited and sufficient air-lift capacity to transport a brigade group such as we now have in Europe -- even with light weapons only -- would be expensive to acquire. Moreover, any decision to contribute forces solely from Canada rather than to maintain some in Europe must be worked out in a responsible manner with our allies so that the cohesiveness of the alliance and the confidence of its members will not be jeopardized by our action.

Although Europe remains in an important sense our first line of defence, we have had to be concerned about the direct defence of our continent ever since the development of a significant Soviet bomber threat to North America. The main point here -- the inescapable fact -- is that geography has linked us inextricably with the United States. It is almost inconceivable that a Soviet attack would be mounted on the U.S.A. without Canada being involved. In any event, as we cannot know Soviet plans, we cannot in making our preparations ignore Soviet capabilities. No responsible government could do otherwise. I do not care which party holds office -- the conclusion would be the same.

Questioning in Canada about the continuing validity of our air-defence arrangements for North America has recently focused on missile development. Some have argued that with missiles, against which there is as yet no effective defence, having replaced the bomber as the main threat to North America a bomber defence is now meaningless. Others claim that it is impossible to separate bomber and missile defence, and that, to avoid becoming involved in the latter, we should withdraw entirely from the air defence of the continent.

It is interesting, I think, to note that, with respect to North American defence, in contrast with NATO arrangements in Europe, our participation is debated primarily on technical issues rather than on calculations of Soviet intentions. Being technical arguments, however, they are more susceptible of refutation. The bomber threat -- to take the first argument -- is no longer serious because our defences are extremely effective. But the Soviet Union retains over 150 bombers capable of attacking North America. And bombers carry larger loads of nuclear weapons. For example, one bomber could destroy Toronto and go on to destroy Montreal. Therefore, as long as the Soviet heavy-bomber force remains in being, it could become, in the absence of continuing air-defence arrangements for North America, a greater threat than Soviet missiles now are. For this reason, as Secretary McNamara tells us and the other NATO countries, the United States Government will continue to maintain a bomber-defence system. Unless one is prepared for a complete transformation in our relations with the United States, Canada has two options: to make some contribution to the bomber-defence system -- and thereby exercise some control over it -- or to give the United States freedom to defend North America, including use of Canadian territory. I, for one, am not prepared to accept the second.

As for the separation of bomber and missile defence arrangements, now that Mr. McNamara has unveiled American plans for a light anti-missile system, I believe the argument of the critics can no longer be sustained. The American system is to be deployed entirely on American territory and Canada can, if it