

*National Defence*

can only do so by being more advanced in research and in the development of the type of weapons which will certainly be used the next war. We must prove to the world that any possible attack upon us will fail. We have been told that we have the best troops in the world, that they are the best fed and best led troops that ever went into battle; and I do not question that. As a matter of fact I am very pleased to learn that our commanding officers rank with Hannibal and Napoleon and others of that class, and that ours are the most contented troops in the world. But that is not enough. Self-praise is not enough. I know of no case in history, at least since the fall of Jericho, in which any worth-while military advantage was gained by the blowing of one's own horn. Hitler gambled on winning the last war because he thought the German army had technical and scientific superiority, and he was almost right. It goes without saying that it is too late to prevent the last war. It is an accomplished fact; it is history. It should be almost as obvious that we cannot prevent the next war by being proficient, no matter how proficient, in the methods of the last war. We must be prepared to defend ourselves against the kind of attack the next war will bring, if it ever comes. We cannot hope to match our enemies in manpower. We must find some way of making each of our fighting men superior to ten of our potential enemies. The accent must be on scientific development, on equipment, on production capacity and technical superiority.

I am not quite clear as to the NATO target in regard to manpower that is regarded as sufficient to defend western Europe during the next three or four years, but I believe it is somewhere between 50 and 100 divisions. We lack a clear statement as to what our commitments are and what facilities we have to meet them, either ourselves as a nation or the NATO countries generally. While listening to spokesmen for the government I got the impression—and I hope it is entirely wrong—that they stood in considerable fear of being trapped into making some statement which was not ambiguous. It may be because of my inability to understand their statements that I am a bit confused; but let us suppose the total commitment of NATO for the next number of years is 50 divisions on the one hand or 100 on the other. I understand the Canadian commitment is one brigade. In other words the Canadian commitment in regard to manpower is somewhere between one-third and two-thirds of one per cent of the total manpower commitment. Therefore the accent certainly

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is not on manpower, and I think the government is on perfectly safe ground there. I do not think there is any danger of the government being criticized because the commitments they have made to NATO in regard to manpower are excessive.

The point is, is the accent anywhere else? Is the accent on technical and scientific developments which will make each of our fighting men superior to ten of our potential enemies? That is what we are faced with. Even 100 divisions in western Europe would be something less than two million men, and it is obvious that our potential enemies could match that manpower three or four or five or even more to one. That is not good enough if we consider it merely on a manpower basis. We cannot hope to match our enemies on that basis.

If our defence effort is to have any point at all we must be capable of preventing a war in which long-range bombers will be used to attack us over the top of the world and over the North Atlantic on the great circle route from Russian bases; and we have to remember that such bombers will carry a load fifty thousand times as effective as the bomb loads carried at the beginning of world war II. We must be prepared to prevent a war in which U-boats of a very superior type will be used in large numbers to attack our shipping, U-boats which while submerged will be capable of greater speeds than any ordinary commercial surface craft. We must be prepared to prevent a war in which such submarines can surface at night off our coasts and fire guided missiles, probably with atomic warheads, into our coastal cities. We must be prepared to prevent a war in which guided missiles will be extensively used, and in which chemical and biological warfare will become a reality in a way hitherto undreamed of. We must be prepared to prevent a war in which rockets that can cross the Atlantic in less than fifteen minutes will be launched against our cities. We must be prepared to prevent a war in which our cities will be attacked with new and hellish weapons such as radioactive dust and many other things which are at present within the scope of scientific possibility, yet are unknown to the average man in the street.

I am perturbed by the fact that our efforts in this regard are not what I believe they should be in relation to our total defence effort. After all, it is not numbers of troops that guarantee superior strength. I notice that in the last two or three years the amount of money granted the defence research board is only something like four or five per cent of the total defence expenditure. Granted some research and development is being done in