

environment becomes increasingly restructured, Canadian maritime strategy must also adjust. Henceforth, the smaller maritime powers can be expected to pursue their own interests and, as argued by Rear-Admiral Fred Crickard (ret.), a research associate of the Centre For Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University, "as the potential of Canada's emerging maritime interest grows, the cost of development and protection will be high and will require sustained public support. Navies are costly, but not having the right one when you need it could be even costlier."⁽⁴⁾ Indeed, prudence dictates that we retain a general purpose force as large as is feasible, under the financial restraints of the time. Such a force would retain acquired technical expertise and would also be capable of expansion in whatever direction were deemed necessary.⁽⁵⁾ The importance of ensuring such a force has recently been illustrated by Canada's participation in the international effort undertaken in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Based on current plans, Canada's naval force will include the *Halifax* class frigates now under construction and the *Tribal* class destroyers. To this force must then be added whatever is necessary to ensure the effective implementation of Canadian maritime policy in the nineties and beyond. In the late 1970s, the Department of National Defence identified a requirement for some 24 frigates to fulfill its mandate. These plans were altered by the 1987 White Paper on Defence, and the total number of frigates to be built is currently under review. The major challenge confronting Canadian maritime policy may not be "Soviet submarines" or the "resupply and reinforcement of Europe," but rather, the effective control of our coastal waters and the 200-mile economic zone. It is with a concern over our ability to exercise this control that we have undertaken our study of maritime sovereignty.

Throughout our deliberations, it became apparent that modern challenges require that we understand "sovereignty" in a broader sense than a traditional and legal approach would suggest. We have focused much of our attention on "non-military" threats, including the need to protect our marine environment and its resources, the interception of drug smuggling, international terrorism and illegal immigration. As well, the Committee addressed the need for an expanded search and rescue capability on the part of Canada's maritime forces. Given that a variety of departments share responsibility for the protection of our maritime sovereignty, the Committee was interested in determining whether the present division of jurisdiction among departments is appropriate, and whether interdepartmental coordination in the discharge of responsibilities is effective.

(4) House of Commons, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs*, (hereafter referred to as Proceedings), 13:7, 13:9.

(5) Maginley, "Maritime Priorities in the Post-Cold War Era" p. 2.