

deterioration in East-West relations, culminating last December in the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, cannot be ignored in this forum. No matter how the intervention is perceived, the international environment has been severely damaged as has the confidence which so crucially underpins the policy of *détente*. We cannot view the Afghan crisis as a purely local or regional issue, or one that falls outside the East-West purview.

At a minimum, Soviet actions have challenged directly the principles in the Final Act of sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, the territorial integrity of states, non-intervention in internal affairs and equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Yet under the Act, the participating states expressed their conviction of the need to make *détente* a comprehensive process, universal in scope. They determined to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. They declared their intention to conduct their relations with all other states in the spirit of the principles of the Final Act. They expressed their common will to act, in the application of those principles, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

History has taught us painfully that confidence and stability in one region of the world cannot remain unaffected by distrust and instability in another quarter of the globe. To ensure that confidence prevails in Europe, the participating states must accept that the same rules of conduct must apply elsewhere. In the absence of such an understanding, and of any clearly-defined boundary between the pursuit of national interests and the practice of restraint, the policy that we have called *détente* will inevitably be undermined.

**Meaning of  
détente**

The alternative to *détente*, the most basic concept of which is the avoidance of resort to armed conflict, is something none of us can contemplate with equanimity. But this irreversibility does not necessarily apply to the apparatus of East-West co-operation, which has grown up around, and as a valued part, of *détente*. Measures which my government, and other governments represented here, were obliged to take in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, demonstrate this fact clearly enough.

The shadow of Afghanistan will inevitably chill *détente* as long as Soviet troops remain there. My government believes, nevertheless, that East and West must share an interest in maintaining a balance of military potential and, accordingly, will continue to follow policies aimed at reducing tensions and expanding co-operation in a process which must be reciprocal, global and indivisible. But if this is what *détente* means, we intend to ensure that it rests on a firm foundation of deterrence.

Mr. Chairman, it is clear that we shall not be able to increase confidence in the political sphere as long as the build-up of arms continues unabated. Political *détente* and the deceleration of the arms race are inseparable. Confidence created by each has a mutually reinforcing impact on the other.

**Confidence-  
building measures**

Looking at the Final Act, we find that its provisions regarding questions of improving military security are modest. Nonetheless, the confidence-building measures instituted