

to unite its strength with the strength of the New World - in a strong and close Atlantic community - so that there will be no temptation for an aggressor to imagine that he can win an easy victory, or, indeed, a victory of any kind.

The attitude of Europe to America, a compound of hope and admiration and anxiety, should be understood by those of us who live in North America, no longer, it is true, in "fire-proof houses", as once some Canadians thought, but still some distance away from the places where fires have previously begun and raged most fiercely. On their part, Europeans should realize that American power is in possession of a people who did not seek it and who will use it, if not always with complete wisdom, yet without aggressive or domineering design. If this were not true, or if it ever ceased to be true, the great coalition for peace, built around the United States, would soon crumble.

An American scholar, Professor Earle, has put the matter in this way:

"It is natural enough that certain segments of European opinion should be concerned lest the United States may come to pursue power for its own sake. It is undoubtedly true that Western Europe would be happier if there were no cold war - that is to say, if there were no Soviet-American test of power. But would Western Europe be more contented, more secure, and more prosperous if the United States were disposed to run the risks of giving the U.S.S.R. a free hand in Europe? Distasteful as American intervention in Europe may be, would even the severest critic of the United States wish to have American economic and military aid withdrawn? Has the United States created the Soviet threat or merely reacted to it? These are questions which Europeans can answer better than Americans, but they are questions which Americans may venture to ask in view of the severe criticism (some of it vindictive, some of it uninformed, some of it admittedly justifiable) which is continuously directed at American policy."

It will help in building up this defensive association with the United States as its centre and leader, if we appreciate another revolutionary change which has taken place over the last half-century, the change in the number and nature of free and sovereign states, which has resulted in what might be called the fragmentation of international society. In the application of the principles of self-government and nationalism, a great number of new, many of them weak, states have been formed. This is an inevitable and should be a healthy process, but some of its results, as I can testify from attending United Nations Assembly meetings where we now have 60 members, make international co-operation and international agreement more difficult. Some of these states are as sensitive about their new freedom as they are conscious of their weakness and indeed conscious of the value to them of the UN for covering up that weakness and pursuing their own ends. Their sensitiveness makes them difficult to deal with, especially at the present moment in the Middle East. Many of these states are in that part of the world, Asia, whose people feel that they have for long been the victims of outside exploitation and suppression, the memory of which lingers on. Most of them need help, if they are to resist the subversive doctrines of Communism