

aggression, but this kind of verbal smokescreen has long since been unable to conceal their own imperialist designs.

The statement of principles which was approved last week was an earnest and sincere attempt to reconcile the first three points of view which I have just mentioned. With the fourth, of course, no reconciliation was possible on honourable terms. Furthermore, our statement was of a nature which gave us reason to believe it could be accepted in Peking, if the Government there had control of its own affairs and sincerely desired peace.

It is important, I think, that even at this late date we should know exactly what that statement contains and what it implies. It may also be of some interest if, as one of those responsible for drafting it, I attempt to give some interpretation of it in view of the confusing and conflicting views that have been expressed as to what it means.

Our statement of principles met, I think, every legitimate point that had been made by the Peking Government. There are those who have complained that in adopting it we have gone too far, that we had compromised our principles for the vain hope of an honourable agreement, that we had surrendered to intimidation and blackmail and that we were in danger of repeating the betrayal of Munich. The tragedy of Munich, however, as I see it, was not in going there; in fact, it might have been better if more Governments had been able to accept the responsibility of being there. The tragedy was in what was done there, and our statement of principles did not, I think, recommend doing anything that meant the betrayal of a people or a principle, nor was it a weak surrender to armed pressure or a naive misunderstanding of a political situation or of the dangers ahead if it were handled the wrong way.

I would not myself participate in or approve of any action which could be fairly described in terms such as those used the other day by the representative of the Philippines. Nor would my country, which I may add was not represented at Munich but was concerned with fighting imperialism and aggression far from its own shores in 1914, 1939 and now in Korea in 1951. Canada has fought in the past to the limit of its military strength and resources and we seek now a firm and honourable foundation for peace to the limit of our political and diplomatic strength, without any illusions about the difficulties ahead and without weakening our defences -- indeed while strengthening them -- in the process. There is nothing of what is called "appeasement" in such a course.

Because of the interpretation given to it in Peking, because of some misunderstanding of it by members of this Committee and because of its misrepresentation by the Soviet bloc, I would like to analyze briefly the statement of principles, as one of those who was initially responsible for it.

Paragraph 1 is of course self-explanatory, giving in a few words the purpose of a cease-fire.

Paragraph 2 is important because it states that steps for the restoration of peace could begin even before a formal cease-fire arrangement had been concluded,