

low key fact-finding and good offices, to more formal procedures for mediation and arbitration, right up to peacekeeping, operating in some cases without consensus if necessary. The Helsinki Document's Chapter III, which Canada had an important managerial role in drafting, reflects the type of spectrum Canada had in mind.

Operation

Canada has made a number of contributions to operationalizing the CSCE's conflict prevention and resolution capacity. One of the more important of these was insisting on a dual mandate for the Conflict Prevention Centre, one that incorporated support both for the political prevention and management of conflict and for the implementation of CSBMs. In the end, the CPC's greatest value has turned out to be in the former area, particularly in fielding preventive diplomacy missions. The mission support unit has given the CPC -- theretofore poorly staffed, undertasked and marginal to European security issues (even in CSBM implementation) -- a new lease on life and a major role in on-the-ground crisis management. Because the unit is the only link between the Chairman-in-Office and the mission in the field, the CPC has come to serve a helpful political as well as logistical function.

Canada also made a notable contribution in advancing the idea of long-term missions, which have proved to be one of the most successful aspects of the CSCE's conflict prevention work. The Canadian-led Kosovo fact-finding mission from which this idea sprang also had a seminal influence in demonstrating that it was possible for a CSCE mission to produce an unbiased report: this encouraged revision of sceptical attitudes towards missions, particularly on the part of the Russians, which in turn helped to secure the future of missions within the CSCE.

Canada helped to spearhead efforts to create a framework for CSCE peacekeeping. Although the relevant provisions of the Helsinki Document's Chapter III have never been applied, they complete the CSCE's spectrum of conflict management tools, provide a practical way of cooperating with NATO and the UN, and are now being refined to allow CSCE monitoring of peacekeeping by other organizations.

No less important, Canada has contributed resources to the CSCE. In addition to its assessed contributions,²⁵ Canada has made voluntary payments to support CSCE causes, including aiding the participation of newly admitted states in CSCE meetings and hosting a forestry meeting in Canada. Canada has also seconded personnel whose quality and dedication have facilitated the accomplishments of several CSCE missions. Canada has not, however, held the Chairmanship, something it may wish to seek if it wishes to maintain its level of influence within the CSCE.

Finally, a contribution that goes beyond the scope of this paper but deserves to be mentioned is Canada's work in advancing the CSBM, CFE and Open Skies negotiations, particularly on the verification side. Since the delegations to the Vienna negotiations also served as national representatives to the CPC Consultative Committee and in some cases to

²⁵Canada contributes 5.45% of the common CSCE costs. This amounted to some \$941,600 in 1990-91, \$777,000 in 1991-92 and \$1,900,000 in 1992-93. These amounts do not include Canada's contributions to the arms control and CSBM negotiations.