Confidence Is Best Developed Under Existing Political Structures

Degrees of state collapse range from weakened or illegitimate governments (in the Sudan for example) to near or outright state failure (for example, Sierra Leone, Liberia or Somalia). Where anarchy undermines the likelihood of stable interaction between disputants, prospects for peace may be improved as its effects are minimized. Ideally, peace processes need to be conducted under a coherent indigenous state structure rather than the chaos of a collapsed state. In Zimbabwe, a coherent state structure and a functioning bureaucracy onto which peacekeeping operations could be "bolted" is said to have been a "major contributor to the success of a peace process and demilitarization."[75] Similarly, Northern Somaliland avoided much of the violent upheaval experienced in the south in the early 1990s in large part because of the presence of a respected indigenous government working in conjunction with credible local clan elders. Those regions of the south which avoided anarchy did so because a more secure environment was established through assertive peacekeeping and the expedient re-establishment of indigenous institutions. Indeed, where local institutions no longer exist, multilateral organizations can have an important facilitation role in recreating them. In Baidoa, for example, Australian efforts to put in place a 'military governor' and to quickly restore a functioning legal system helped rebuild local confidence in the rule of law and improve security relative to other regions of the south.[76]

Critical Resources Must Be Forthcoming

`The establishment of confidence comes not just from the *presence* of a stabilizing force but the *execution* of the peace process itself. The confidence of warring parties is contingent on the prompt arrival of a peacekeeping force and the provision of resources to meet obligations. Conversely, the failure to provide funds promised during the negotiation phase or to follow through on promises made to demobilize factions can undermine confidence in the peacekeepers and the peace process in general.[77] In Zimbabwe, tensions increased dramatically when inadequate food provisions were available for guerrillas in the assembly areas. The guerrillas claimed that the monitoring force was either trying to "wipe them out" or to force them to abandon the assembly areas so that they might be accused of breaking the agreement. In Somalia, American efforts to disarm the local population through a food-for-guns program were derailed when UNITAF forces began to run short on wheat flour.[78] Such a failure not only left American forces with no other

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[75] Ginifer, p. 55.

[76] On the different experiences of peacekeeping in southern Somalia, see Robert G. Patman, "Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers During United Nations Intervention," *African Affairs* 96 (1997), pp. 521-22.

[77] Stedman and Rothchild, pp. 26-7.

[78] Food-for-guns initiatives were probably the only realistic option in these cases. At the time, various proposals were made in the popular press calling for massive cash-for-guns plans. See, for example, Raymond Bonner,