

programme, again based on the work of SDC, was that **autonomous reintegration** should be encouraged as much as possible without special projects targeted at ex-combatants, as these, it was feared, would frustrate those not entitled, while at the same time unduly raising expectations and discouraging personal initiative among the ex-combatants.<sup>77</sup>

Significant problems, both political and practical, combined to seriously retard the implementation of the DDRP. These included the deterioration in the political climate during the slow deployment of the peacekeeping operation which exacerbated the reluctance of the parties to commit themselves fully to the process, the unsuitability of many of the AAs chosen by the parties and the sheer inability of RENAMO to participate as envisaged in the GPA without significant assistance. Determined to ensure that RENAMO, unlike UNITA in Angola, would not be able to keep both its military and political options open going into the election, the Secretary-General sought and obtained from the parties an agreement to a new election timetable and, from the Security Council, an extension of the ONUMOZ mandate.<sup>78</sup>

Once the initial problems were overcome and the DDRP finally begun in earnest, ONUMOZ was confronted with a quite different problem -- significantly larger numbers of combatants seeking to demobilize than had been anticipated. Far fewer soldiers opted to join FADM than either RENAMO or the Government had expected. Funds had to be found to pay the additional pensions and reintegration benefits for which no provision had been made. The international community ultimately proved equal to this task. In the meantime, however, the delays occasioned by this financial shortfall were exacerbated by the difficulty the parties had in coming to grips with the lowered numbers available for the unified defence force. Fearful of being unable to supply their desired number, each party withheld the lists detailing which soldiers were to be demobilized and which were to join the FADM. The result was that, rather than spending about three weeks in the AAs, soldiers languished there for extended periods. While the UN put the time to good use through various educational efforts, the frustration often led to outbursts:

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<sup>77</sup> See Eric Berman's discussion of the SDC studies and conclusions at pp. 78-79 of *"Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique"*, UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, Volume 96/22. He outlines the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plans developed by SDC for the Government of Mozambique at pp. 57-58.

<sup>78</sup> In paragraph 86, p.26 of *The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume V, op.cit.*, the Secretary-General states, "This conclusion [that Mozambique's planned elections should not take place until the military aspects of the Agreement had been implemented] was reinforced by the events following Angola's elections in the preceding weeks; there, the failure to complete demobilization had enabled the loser of the election to launch an all-out war."